Research On Xiongan New Area Undertaking Non-Capital Functions Of Beijing Based On Mechanism Design Theory

The establishment of the Xiongan New Area is a major strategy of our country based on the new situation,whose primary purpose is to undertake the non-capital functions of Beijing.At present,population,environment,transportation,housing and other aspects in Beijing are not optimistic,for example,populations are gathering more,disasters are more frequent,traffic is getting more congested,and housing prices are rising rapidly.The root cause of these phenomena lies in that Beijing has gathered too many non-capital functions as the capital of our country.Through the Xiongan New Area,where the non-capital functions concentrated,it can transfer some non-capital functions out of Beijing,which can alleviate the severe situation where Beijing faces effectively.At the same time,Xiongan New Area can also form the new two wings of Beijing with Tongzhou,the location of the Beijing's sub-center.This paper starts from the perspectives of the four main bodies:government,enterprises,society and practitioners,and analyzes benefits and costs which non-capital functions bring to Beijing and Xiongan New Area from the perspectives of the four.On this basis,this paper constructs the evolutionary game model,and analyzes the optimal equilibrium strategy of Beijing and Xiongan New Area under different conditions,and gives the conditions for promoting cooperation between the two places:When the total undertaking cost of Xiongan New Area is lower than the sum of government income,the income of practitioners and the social income under specific probability,the sum of Beijing government's dissolving cost and social cost is lower than the sum of government's dissolving income,the difference between the income and cost of the enterprise,the difference between the profit and the cost of the practitioner and the social income,Beijing will choose the supported strategy andXiongan New Area will choose the active strategy.Finally,the willingness of the two places to cooperate will be reached.The Matlab software is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game model.This paper uses mechanism design and principal-agent theory to establish a cooperation mechanism between the central government and JingXiong governments with the participation of the central government.The conclusions are as follows:when the information between the central government and JingXiong governments is symmetrical,the central government can design an incentive contract to make JingXiong governments reach the Pareto optimal effort level.When the information between the central government and JingXiong governments is asymmetric,the central government needs to design the incentive contracts,the rewards and punishments to encourage the governments of JingXiong to choose the best level of effort.The higher the reward and punishment coefficient set by the central government,the more efforts the governments of JingXiong will make.The reward and punishment coefficient is negatively related to the effort cost coefficient of local governments,risk aversion and variance.It is positively related to the central government's marginal supervision cost.The risk aversion and effort cost coefficient of JingXiong governments are negatively related to the expected benefits of the central government.