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Research On Credit Risk Management Of Logistics Finance

Posted on:2020-02-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M L WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330575974449Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)are the most dynamic group in the national economy,which have been plagued by financing difficulties for a long time.The development of logistics finance has opened up financing channels for SMEs,improved their financing efficiency,and become an effective way to solve the financing problems of SMEs.However,the development of logistics finance still faces many problems,among which credit risk is the most important.Only by controlling credit risk can logistics finance develop smoothly.At the present stage,objective credit risk has already had quite mature measurement methods and means,but subjective credit risk has not been effectively controlled.Therefore,taking warehouse receipt pledge model as an example,this paper utilizes evolutionary game theory to study and analyze the subjective credit risk of logistics finance.Firstly,this paper introduces the concept and operation mode of logistics finance,briefly expounds the related concepts of principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory,then introduces the respective roles of the three main bodies of logistics finance in order to put forward the principal-agent relationship,and then identifies the credit risk faced by financial institutions in logistics finance business,and divides the subjective credit risk of logistics finance into the default risk of financing enterprises and the collusion risk of logistics enterprises;then,the evolutionary game model is introduced to analyze the behavior relations of financial institutions,financing enterprises and logistics enterprises in warehouse receipt pledge mode,and the evolutionary game models of financial institutions and financing enterprises,financial institutions and logistics enterprises are constructed respectively.By analyzing the choice of different strategies of game participants driven by their interests,the mechanism of default risk and collusion risk is obtained,and the theoretical results are validated by assignment.Data simulation is carried out by using MATLAB software to find out the influencing factors of default risk and collusion risk.Finally,the conclusion of the study is summarized and the pertinent suggestions are put forward.The research finds that the influencing factors of default risk include fines imposed by financial institutions on financing enterprises,the cost of strengthening supervision by financial institutions,the integrity management fee of financing enterprises,the deception fee of financing enterprises and thecollateral value of financing enterprises;the influencing factors of collusion risk include the cost of strengthening supervision by financial institutions on logistics enterprises,the penalties and rewards imposed by financial institutions on logistics enterprises,the additional benefits of logistics enterprises and whitewash costs.This paper introduces the evolutionary game model to study the credit risk of logistics finance.The results provide theoretical reference for the field of logistics finance,and put forward reasonable suggestions for the control of the credit risk of logistics finance,which promotes the healthy and sustainable development of logistics finance in China.
Keywords/Search Tags:logistics finance, credit risk, evolutionary game
PDF Full Text Request
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