Supply Chain Coordination With Demand Depends On Inventory Level In Random Environment

There is a type of products on the market,its demand is influenced by random factors and the inventory level.When the inventory level is higher,some customers purchasing desire will be inspired,the product sales is higher,but when the inventory level is low,some customers will cancel the purchase plan,thus product sales will decrease.High inventory can improve the product sales,but the retailer should bear the higher inventory risk.Therefore,desining ordering strategy which can effectively stimulate demand and control the risk becomes one of the important works for supply chain decision makers.In this thesis,the coordination for a special kind of supply chain is discussed in random environment.The basic demand of the product is a random variable,however,in the process of saleing,product inventory level can affect demand,namely when the inventory level is higher,the actual demand of the product increases and when the inventory level is low,the actual demand of the product decreases.The main contents include:(1)The supply chain coordination between wholesale price and buyback contract is studied.By establishing a decision model and analyzing the retailer's optimal ordering strategy,we found the condition which can coordinated supply chain based on wholesale price and buyback contract.Finally,the theoretical results are verified by numerical examples,and it is found that high inventory can stimulate demand and increase the expected profit of the supply chain.However,high inventory will increase the surplus products,which will result in a loss of profits.(2)The supply chain coordination problem of retailer with inventory risk aversion preference is studied.Taking the probability of surplus products exceeding the predetermined value as the inventory risk measurement of the retailer,we analyze the retailer's ordering strategy,and discuss the ways to realize supply chain coordination through rebate and penalty contract.Numerical analysis shows that with the increase of sales target,the retailer's expected profit decreases and the supplier's expected profit increases.When the retailer's inventory risk aversion exceeds a certain range,the retailer will reduce the order quantity,so the expected profit of the supply chain cannot be optimized and the supply chain is not coordinated.(3)The supply chain coordination problem of retailer with loss aversion preference is studied.Using piecewise linear utility function as the utility function of retailer with loss aversion preference,the optimal decision based on revenue sharing contract is discussed.The research results show that the revenue sharing contract can make the expected utility of the retailer and the expected profit of the supply chain system reach the optimal level at the same time.The theoretical results are verified by numerical analysis,and it is found that in the supply chain coordination,with the increase of retailer's loss aversion,the wholesale price decreases,while the proportion of revenue sharing increases.With the increase of retailer's loss aversion,the retailer's expected utility increases,while the supplier's and supply chain's expected profit decreases.When the retailer's loss aversion exceeds a certain value,the greater the demand elasticity parameter is,the lower the retailer's expected utility is.This thesis studies a special kind of supply chain,that is,the demand of products is random and the inventory level of products has a positive and negative effect on the demand of products.The coordination problem for supply chain of the retailer with different risk attitudes is discussed respectively,which provides a beneficial reference for supply chain management practice.