Research On Benefit Distribution Of O2O Shared Bicycle Supply Chain Under Cooperative And Non-cooperative Game Theory

The shared bicycle industry is growing based on the sharing economy and the O2O platform.As an emerging industry derived from "Internet+",the revenue mode of shared bicycle has received much attention.The shared bicycle operators are profitable through the business model of ionline consumption and offline use.Several shared bicycle operators had terminated their operation and exited the market,the main reasons are the excessive increase in production costs of the supply chain upstream and the broken of the capital chain which caused by excessive investment and rapid expansion.Meanwhile,excessively high breakage rate makes it difficult for the shared bicycle supply chain to form a closed loop and achieve profitability.Therefore,studying the rational distribution of revenue in the shared bicycle supply chain under the O2O business model is the core issue for the sustainable development of the Internet of Things industry under the shared economy.This paper analyzes several major revenue models of the shared bicycle industry,and explores the problems of the income model to deeply analyze the operating and profitability of the shared bicycle industry.Considering users’ online shared bicycle demand count and the number of offline demand vehicles in actual situation,and the sensitivity of shared bicycle’s performance experience and the timing charge amount.This paper taking the shared bicycle operator’s R&D investment and manufacturers’ productivity investment as decision variables,establishes an input-demand income function.Under the cooperative game,shared bicycle operators and manufacturers form alliances,the overall goal is to maximize revenue of the O2O supply chain and establishes a revenue allocation model based on Owen coalition values method for shared bicycle O2O supply chain,and gives a specific income distribution plan.Under the non-cooperative game,shared bicycle operators and manufacturers are competitive in the supply chain,they operate and produce to maximizing individual returns.This chapter takes operators as dominant players and manufacturer as subject players,and establishes Stackelberg competition game model,to gain the Stackelberg game equilibrium point between operators and manufacturers in the shared bicycle O2O supply chain.Analyzing the optimal investment strategy and maximum benefit of shared bicycle operators and manufacturers,and compare the changes of variables in different situations.Further studying while the shared bicycle companies’ investment and market demand are fuzzy variables,the profit distribution of the shared bicycle O2O supply chain is analyzed based on fuzzy cooperative and non-cooperative game.Introduced fuzzy mathematics to Owen coalition values to propose the fuzzy Owen coalition values method and prove its validity.Using fuzzy Owen coalition values to derive the revenue distribution plan of shared bicycle O2O supply chain while enterprises input are uncertain.Blurring the number of vehicles in the shared bicycle market and the production costs of manufacturers,the income of the shared bicycle operators and manufacturers under the fuzzy non-cooperative game is obtained based on the Cournot model.