| The core of the reform of the tax distribution system in 1994 is to redefine the relationship between the central and local governments.The relationship between them is mainly reflected by the division of revenue and expenditure responsibilities.The reform of the tax distribution system inclines the financial power to the central government,but the local government assumes more power,which ultimately leads to the local government's inadequate revenue and expenditure.Specifically,the reform of the tax distribution system has formed the central tax,the local tax and the central-local shared tax according to the tax categories.The biggest change is that the central government will own all the consumption tax and 75% of the value-added tax revenue,which has also led to the shrinkage of local government revenue.However,the reform of tax distribution system only stipulates how to divide tax revenue between central and provincial governments,and how to divide revenue below provincial level between cities and counties is decided by provincial governments themselves.At the same time,the tax distribution system has not changed the division of power and expenditure responsibility,so the central government has obtained a large amount of revenue from local governments,but has not fulfilled the expenditure responsibility matched with financial rights.On the contrary,local governments bear most of the expenditure responsibility,but have no financial rights matched with expenditure responsibility.The income and expenditure responsibility between central and local governments is asymmetric.The downward shift of the task layers is all pressured on the grass-roots government,which eventually forms the predicament of "the financial power layer by layer receives,the power layer by layer moves down",and causes the local financial pressure to become increasingly prominent.The relationship between central government and local government is a kind of vertical financial competition.Both sides compete around political rights and economic interests and eventually achieve a shortterm balance in the game process.But once this balance is broken by external changes,local governments will adopt new strategies to achieve a new balance beneficial to themselves.The reform of tax distribution system in 1994,the reform of income tax sharing in 2002 and the reform of agricultural tax in 2005,and even the "business-tobusiness increase" in 2016 broke this balance by continuously reducing the local government's financial revenue.The resulting financial pressure forced local governments to find new sources of income.Compared with other fiscal revenue,the vast majority of land transfer income belongs to local fiscal revenue,and local governments have larger operating space in their disposal and use.This advantage makes land transfer income become the only choice for local governments to increase revenue.However,a series of social problems have also been derived from the land development model,such as land violations,real estate price bubbles,and the 1 billion 800 million mu arable land red line is at stake.In this context,the study of the relationship between local government financial pressure and land transfer behavior has important practical significance.In this paper,fiscal pressure and the scale of land transfer of local government,the choice of land transfer mode and land illegal acts are placed in the same framework.Empirical research is carried out with provincial and municipal data from 2000 to 2016.The results of this study show that in order to alleviate financial pressure,local governments will increase the scale of land transfer in order to obtain land transfer income,and for different land transfer modes,local governments tend to sell land by market-oriented bidding.In addition,this paper also studies the impact of financial pressure on local government land violations.The results show that the aggravation of financial pressure will significantly increase the illegal area of local government land.Considering the vast territory of our country and the significant differences between regions,this paper also carries out regional grouping regression to clarify the heterogeneity of the causal relationship between local financial pressure and the land transfer behavior of local governments in different regions.The results show that the effect of local financial pressure on the land transfer behavior of local governments is relatively obvious in the eastern and central regions,but not in the western regions.This study provides a theoretical reference for regulating and correcting the distorted land transfer behavior of local governments.This paper is divided into five parts.The first chapter is the introduction,in this part,this paper mainly introduces the research background.The second chapter is to sort out the domestic and foreign literature from three aspects: the scale of land transfer,the way of land transfer and local government land violations,and then draw out the theme of this study.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis,which will reveal the impact of local financial pressure on the scale,mode and illegal land transfer from a normative perspective.Chapter IV is an empirical analysis of the impact of financial pressure on land transfer,transfer methods and illegal land use.At the same time,the corresponding robustness test is also carried out for the reliability of the results.The fifth chapter is the conclusion and policy recommendations.On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical test,according to the actual situation of our country,the corresponding policy recommendations are put forward.Firstly,in the short run,we need to increase the transfer payment from the central government to the local government.In the long run,we need to establish new local financial resources and solve the problem of local financial shortage from the root.Second,improve the supervision and budget management of land transfer income.Thirdly,we should strengthen the market-oriented construction and supervision of land transfer,and weaken the ability of local governments to manipulate the land market.Fourthly,we should improve the relevant land systems,improve the land property rights system,and standardize the land requisition system and the rural land transfer system in China.Fifth,improve the land law enforcement and supervision system.In addition to maintaining the independence of the land supervision department,the supervision and supervision authority of the Department should be expanded.Sixth,change the current promotion mechanism of officials.The contributions of this paper are mainly as follows: Firstly,unlike previous studies,which use provincial panel data more frequently,this paper uses prefecturelevel city data to examine the impact of fiscal pressure on the scale and mode of transfer,and examines the relationship between local fiscal pressure and land transfer behavior from a lower level of government,which enhances the generalization of empirical conclusions.At the same time,this paper intends to test the robustness of the relationship between financial pressure and land transfer,so as to make the results more reliable.Secondly,besides the basic empirical analysis,this paper also investigates the influence of different strategies and financial pressures on the illegal land leasing behavior of local governments in different ways,expands the scope of research on fiscal pressures and land leasing behavior,and is a useful supplement to the research on local behavior under financial pressures.Finally,this paper also attempts to examine the regional differences in the impact of fiscal pressure on land transfer behavior. |
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