Research On Retailers' Information Sharing Decision Under Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the popularity of the Internet and the rapid development of logistics technology,e-commerce has been well developed and applied.Online shopping has gradually become the choice of more and more consumers.Manufacturers have begun to introduce online direct marketing channels.The traditional offline entity retailing combined with online direct marketing has gradually become more and more enterprises for the sale of their products.With the introduction of manufacturer's online direct marketing channel,because of the price difference of different channels,some consumers experience offline and buy it online,after enjoying the pre-sale service provided by retailers to match their own needs,does not translate into the final purchase,but purchases through online channels with lower prices.At the same time,the dual marginal effect between retailers and manufacturers caused by information asymmetry and lack of information sharing seriously damages the interests of both,and the free-riding behavior of consumers based on pre-sale services aggravates the original channel conflict.The information sharing among members of supply chain is conducive to cooperation among members,improve decision-making,and increase their profits.Therefore,this paper introduces consumer free-riding behavior into the dual-channel supply chain,and explores the value of the retailer sharing market demand information with the manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain with consumer free-riding behavior.Based on the free-riding theory and information sharing theory,with the help of profit maximization analysis and Stackelberg analysis,this paper studies the profits of the retailer,the manufacturer and the supply chain under two situations: when the manufacturer can observe and cannot observe the retailer's market demand information acquisition status.By comparison the profits when the retailer shares information and does not share information,the value of information sharing is obtained.The results show that: When the manufacturer can observe the retailer's market demand information acquisition status,because of the existence of free-riding behavior and the disadvantageous position of the retailer in information sharing,the retailer's information sharing is disadvantageous to itself;But it is beneficial to enhance the overall interests of the manufacturer and the supply chain;When the manufacturer can not observe the retailer's market demand information acquisition status,although the free-riding behavior of consumers will reduce the value of retailer information sharing to itself,the retailer sharing market demand information to the manufacturer will help improve the retailer's own and the overall profit level of the supply chain,and in most cases canimprove the manufacturer's profits.At the same time,on the basis of theoretical analysis,the sensitivity of each important parameter is analyzed through the example analysis.In this paper,consumer free-riding behavior is introduced into information sharing among members of dual-channel supply chain,and the value of retailer demand information sharing in dual-channel supply chain with consumer free-riding behavior is studied.The related research on information sharing in dual-channel supply chain is theoretically expanded.At the same time,it has certain practical significance for guiding the practice of dual-channel supply chain management,and provides suggestions for information sharing decision-making among enterprises.