Research On The Information Asymmetry And Cost Sharing Contract Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Under The Behavior Of "free Rider"

The 21 st century is an era of informatization.The rapid development of e-commerce platforms and the use of information technology has opened up new sales channels for the supply chain.More and more consumers choose to purchase goods online.However,due to the lack of sensibility of products in online channels,a certain percentage of consumers will try or try on them in physical stores,and instead buy online.Therefore,the coexistence of online and offline has caused consumers to "free ride" has become the norm.At the same time,the sharp rise in rents and labor costs in recent years has caused retailers' profits to fall sharply.In order to seek more benefits,retailers use their exclusive information to lie to manufacturers more and more seriously.This makes the management of dual-channel supply chain evolve into a more complicated management art.How to coordinate the relationship of various members on the premise of ensuring the interests of each member enterprise in the dual-channel supply chain has become a research hotspot in the field of supply chain management.This paper establishes a dual-channel supply chain with “free-riding” behavior under centralized decision-making,a symmetrical information situation and a manufacturer-led decentralized decision-making dual-channel supply chain model under informationasymmetric information.Calculate the decision-making plan to maximize the profits of the members of the supply chain at all levels in each situation,and perform sensitivity analysis on different parameters in each situation.At the same time,the cost-sharing contract is used to optimize and coordinate the dual channels under asymmetric information.The main conclusions drawn by the study are:(1)In the case of dual-channel supply chain information symmetry,centralized decision-making can find an optimal proportion of free-riders for supply chain managers,so that supply chain members can benefit at the same time;The profits of manufacturers and retailers decrease with the increase in the proportion of free riders,that is,the increase in consumer free rider behavior will not increase the profits of manufacturers.(2)In a dual-channel supply chain with asymmetric information,the retailer lied to the manufacturer through its advantage in cost information to increase its own profits,but this behavior seriously damaged the overall profits of the manufacturer and the supply chain.;The retailer's service level for consumers has declined due to the expansion of its own profit space.It can be seen that cost misrepresentation is unfavorable to the supply chain,and the greater the misrepresentation of retailers,the greater the damage to the supply chain and the greater the self-interest gains.(3)The introduction of the cost-sharing contract has improved the profits of both manufacturers and retailers,and the total profit of the supply chain has also achieved Pareto improvements.At the same time,consumers can enjoy more quality services provided by retailers.The research in this paper improves the relevant theories of supply chain management,and provides a basis and reference for the business decision-making in the "free ride" situation and information asymmetry.