Research On The Closed-loop Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism Considering Corporate Social Responsibility Under Different Recycling Modes

Nowadays,the increase of various used products has posed a serious threat to the ecological environment and sustainable development of resources.It is an effective means to deal with this issue by manufacturers' fulfilling Corporate Society Responsibility(CSR)and implementing collection and remanufacturing.Base on this background,this paper studies closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)contract coordination mechanism with consideration of CSR under different collection modes.Specifically,consumer surplus is used as an index to measure the manufacturer's CSR performance.For centralized and decentralized decision models,the equilibrium prices,collection rates and profits of channel members are derived and compared under two single collection modes(manufacturer collection mode and third-party collection mode)and their hybrid collection mode.By taking the results of centralized decision model as a benchmark,revenue sharing(RS)contract,revenue-cost sharing(RCS)contract and two-part tariff(TT)contract are utilized to realize the perfect coordination of three decentralized CLSC,respectively.The ranges of contract parameters under three collection modes are compared and analyzed,and then more managerial insights are obtained.The conclusions show that:(1)For decentralized decision models,from the perspective of collection rate and channel members' profits,the manufacturer collection mode is strictly superior to the third-party collection mode.In both centralized decision and decentralized decision,the comparisons between hybrid collection mode and two single collection modes depend on the competition intensity between two collection channels.When the competition between two collection channels is relatively mild,the hybrid collection mode is better than two single collection modes;by contrast,when the competition is fierce,the hybrid collection mode is worse than two single collection modes.(2)For CLSC coordination with RS and RCS contracts,when the manufacturer increases his CSR level,the wholesale prices under coordinated conditions decrease,while the shares of sales revenue that the manufacturer receives from the retailer increase.The upper and lower limits of manufacturer collection mode are higher than that of third-party collection mode,respectively,while the upper and lower limit of the revenue share that the manufacturer receives from the retailer in manufacturer collection CLSC is lower than that in third-party collection CLSC.(3)For CLSC coordination with TT contract,when the manufacturer increases his CSR level,the wholesale prices under coordinated conditions also decrease.The wholesale prices under two single collection modes are equivalent.The upper limit of fixed transfer payments that the retailer can afford and the lower limit of the fixed amount that the manufacturer needs to receive in manufacturer collection mode are lower than those in third-party collection mode.The comparisons between hybrid collection mode and two single collection modes under RCS and TT contracts also depend on initial parameter settings.The above conclusions can provide theoretical supports for the manufacturer who is at the core of CLSC to fulfill CSR and promote the cooperation among CLSC channel members based on different collection modes.