Study On Pricing Decisions Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Different Subsidy Polices

In order to achieve the dual goals of protecting the ecological environment and developing the social economy,more and more scholars have studied closed-loop supply chain management.The government plays an important role in the formation and development of closed-loop supply chains.The policies formulated by the government will have an impact on corporate pricing decisions and consumer behavior.In the context of different market-oriented and closed-loop supply chain structures,the thesis considers the impact of government subsidies on pricing decisions for closed-loop supply chains.This thesis mainly starts from the following aspects:First,the background and significance of the thesis are elaborated,the previous literatures related to the closed-loop supply chain pricing and government subsidy are summarized.The shortcomings of previous generations and innovation of this thesis are illustrated.Second,the relevant concepts and theoretical foundations of closed-loop supply chain,game theory and government incentive mechanism are described.Third,the third,fourth and fifth chapters of the thesis respectively establish closed-loop supply chain pricing model.Chapter three considers in a manufacturer dominant closed-loop supply chain with traditional sales model(for short,"traditional mode"),the subsidy object is set up for the pricing model of the manufacturer,the retailer,the third-party recycler and consumers,and the optimal pricing decision is obtained.By comparing different pricing decisions and numerical examples,the results show that: 1.The government formulates subsidies for the manufacturer,with the increase of the influence coefficient of government subsidies,is conducive to increasing the pricing(the manufacturer repurchase prices,retailer and third-party recycler collect prices.)of recycling channels.2.The government formulates subsidies for the retailer,with the increase of the influence coefficient of government subsidies,is conducive to increasing the wholesale price and decreasing the retail price.3.The government formulates subsidies for the third-party recycler,with the increase of the influence coefficient of government subsidies,is conducive to increasing the third-party recycler collect price and decreasing the manufacturer repurchase prices and retailer collect price.4.The government formulates subsidies for consumers,with the increase of the influence coefficient of government subsidies,is conducive to increasing the pricing(retail price and wholesale price)of sales channel.The fourth chapter and the fifth chapter respectively considering manufacturer-led and retailer-led,in the closed-loop supply chain with traditional retail channel and e-tail channel("dual-channel mode"),the subsidy object is set up for the pricing model of the manufacturer,the retailer,the third-party recycler and consumers,and the optimal pricing decision is obtained.By comparing different pricing decisions and numerical examples,the conclusion is the same as in chapter three.However,the sales channel pricing in the fourth chapter and the fifth chapter includes the retail price and wholesale price of the traditional retail channel and the direct sales price of the e-tail channel.Comparing the optimal pricing decisions in the third and fourth chapter,it is found that in the models of different subsidies,the pricing of each member in the dual-channel model is higher than that of the members in the traditional model,which is more conducive to the overall social welfare and the closed-loop supply chain operation.The last part summarizes the main work,conclusions and limitations,puts forward the future research directions of this thesis.