Research On The Emergency Incentive Strategy Of Assembly Supply Chains Under The Supply Disruption

Nowadays,the economic globalization makes the supply chain more complex,and the supply chain competition under lean production becomes fiercer.With the expanding of the supply chain network and the pursuit of efficiency in terms of time,supply chains are especially fragile under the surface of prosperity.Natural disasters,man-made accidents,policy factors and other factors constantly impact the supply chain,which is exposed to the risk of disruption at any time.Once the supply chain disruption occurs,it will not only cause the production and business activities of the disrupted enterprise can not be conducted normally,but also get other enterprises into trouble,causing the fluctuation and even paralysis of the whole supply chain,and the damage will be enormous.Supply disruption is the most common form of supply chain disruptions.How to deal with the risk of supply disruption effectively,especially in the assembly system,is a problem highly concerned by the enterprise operator and the academia.In view of the above supply disruption problem,based on the power relationship between enterprises in the assembly supply chain,this paper studies the recovery and incentive problems in the assembly system,which are discussed through two parts.By adopting two kinds of incentive strategies between enterprises,complete delivery incentive and cost-sharing incentive,considering the characteristic of the two incentive mechanisms and the relationship of different bodies,power is given a new explanation,according to the relationship between the unreliable supplier and the assembler,and between the reliable supplier and the assembler,the power structure of the assembly system is divided into four kinds.First of all,for the two power structures of high-power reliable supplier,the production recovery decisions are studied under no incentive,complete delivery incentive and cost-sharing incentive,and the value of the incentive strategy,the strategic preference of the participant and the influence of the power relationship between the unreliable supplier and the assembler are analyzed according to the expected profit.Secondly,for the two power structures under low-power reliable suppliers,the decision of production recovery,the incentive value and the strategic preference are analyzed and studied,also compared with the previous part,and focuses on the influence of power relationship between the reliable supplier and the assembler.The results show that both the cost-sharing incentive strategy and the complete delivery incentive strategy can improve the production recovery effort of the unreliable supplier,but when the recovery coefficient of production capacity is small,the production recovery effort of the former is not enough and the latter is excessive,and the optimal production recovery effort of supply chain can be achieved under both incentive strategies when the recovery coefficient of production capacity is large.The two incentive strategies can effectively enhance the profits of the whole supply chain and the cost-sharing incentive strategy can enhance the profit of each participating party,while the complete delivery incentive can only enhance the profit of the higher power party when the assembler power is lower than that of the reliable supplier and the profits of the high-power party and the reliable supplier can be raised on the contrary.When the he production capacity recovery coefficient is small,the strategy preference of the unreliable supplier and the assembler is the same,which are preferred to the cost-sharing incentive strategy;and the strategy preferences of them are opposite when the production capacity recovery coefficient is large.Under the incentive of complete delivery,between the unreliable supplier and the assembler,when the power of the assembler is higher,its profit level can be improved by increasing the recovery coefficient of production capacity and reducing the probability of disruption,but the opposite situation exists under certain conditions when the unreliable supplier's power is high.Under the incentive of cost-sharing,the profits of the unreliable supplier and the assembler increase with the increase of the production capacity recovery coefficient and decrease with an increase in the probability of disruption.The power relationship between the assembler and the reliable supplier will affect the preference tendency of the assembler or the unreliable supplier to the two strategies when the power of each is higher,the complete delivery incentive value's limit that the assembler will give the unreliable supplier,the validity of the complete delivery incentive,The cost-sharing ratio given by the assembler and the production recovery effort of the unreliable supplier.