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Research On Pricing Decision Of Complex Equipment Remanufacturing Supply Chain Under Quality Uncertainty

Posted on:2020-09-21Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L Y TanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330596479476Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The renovation of product is accelerated by the rapid development of science and technology.Meanwhile,the increase of industrial waste year by year has become a significant problem of the modern society.The complex equipment remanufacturing,which is a green manufacturing method for products maintaining and upgrading,is an approach to achieve efficiently resources utilized and the sustainable development Because damage degree and failure form of components are different,and quality level is hard to fully detect,so there are uncertainties in the quality evaluation of supply chain members.In addition,due to complex equipment remanufacturing has a long production cycle and high expense,supply chain members have difficulty in bargaining on the remanufacturing prices under the quality uncertainty.The special characteristic of complex equipment remaufacturing are reflected in the small batch production model,diversification of technologies and high degree of customization,which makes its remanufacturing supply chain are different with general products in many aspects,such as used parts recycling,production,sales,market demand.Moreover,supply chain structure and operation mode will have a great impact on the decision-making behavior.Taking the factors above into consideration;this paper studies the pricing decision in three kinds of complex equipment remanufacturing under quality uncertainty.First of all,we focus on the pricing decision of direct-operation complex equipment remanufacturing supply chain.A remanufacturer negotiates price with a client under quality uncertainty of the used and the rem.anufactured equipment respectively.Based on the two-stage bargaining game model,we obtain the optimal price strategy of remanufacturer and client when they conclude transactions,and analyze the influence of complex equipment quality on optimal price and expected payoff of supply chtain members.The results show that remanufacturer charges cheaper and client pays more,when the minimum quality level of complex equipment is high before and after remanufacturing.In this situation,remanufacturer and client are easier to make a deal,and both of them can gain more payoff.Corresponding to the direct-operation supply chain,we study the pricing decision of platform-based complex equipment remanufacturing supply chain.Remanufacturing platform bilateral bargains with a remanufacturer and a client under quality uncertainty.After building and solving the bilateral game model,we obtain the remanufacturing price and the expected payoff of every supply chain member.Furthermore,the influence of quality level on the optimal decision variables is discussed.By the deeply analysis on the results,we find that only bilateral pricing decisions are considered simultaneously by remanufacturing platforms,the final remanufacturing price can be obtained.Besides,although remanufacturer negotiate with customer indirectly,client's bargaining power and patience could still affect the remanufacturer's payoff.Because of the quality uncertainty,there is no more and less relationship between the remanufacturer and client's payoff in two-stage bargaining game.However,the boundary conditions exist for remanufacture and client to choose make a transaction with the remanufacturing platform.In the last part,we concentrate on the pricing decision of competitive complex equipment remanufacturing supply chain.A client bargain with an original equipment remanufacturer and an independent remanufacturer respectively under quality uncertainty.We establish the two-stage bargaining game models between client and two remanufacturers,and find the optimal pricing strategy.The results show that,the original equipment remanufacturer's charge is more affected than the independent remanufacturer by the minimum quality level of used equipment.When client negotiates with independent remanufacturer,minimum quality level of remanufactured equipment has a greater impact on the pays of client.In addition,supply chain members have boundary conditions for choosing to make transactions with each other under quality uncertainty.Considering quality uncertainty of complex equipment before and after remanufacturing,this paper quantifies the pricing decision in three kinds of remanufacturing supply chain.By establishing two-stage bargaining game model,we quantify the dynamic pricing behavior of remanufacturing supply chain members,and finally acquire researching conclusions which could provide references for supply chain enterprises to make reasonable pricing decisions.
Keywords/Search Tags:complex equipment, quality uncertainty, remanufacturing supply chain, Bargaining Game, pricing decision
PDF Full Text Request
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