Management Equity Incentive, Tax Planning And Enterprise Value

Tax revenue accounts for a high proportion of Chinese fiscal revenue,accounting for more than 80% of the total.It is the economic basis for safeguarding the country's multiparty functions.With the tax reform and the separation of management rights and ownership,at the micro level—the business process of enterprises tax planning decisions and behaviors have also attracted extensive attention and discussion from scholars.With the continuous development and improvement of the modern enterprise system,the principal-agent problem brought about by the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights can greatly affect corporate tax planning behavior,implementing equity incentives for management can link the interests of management and owners to alleviate the principal-agent problem.Moreover,Chinese enterprises have special property rights,and there are differences in the business objectives and governance structures of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Therefore,based on the research of tax planning and enterprise value,it is of practical significance to join the internal governance factor of management equity incentives and combine with Chinese actual national conditions.The traditional tax planning theory believes that corporate tax planning can improve tax revenue and cash flow,and the company's goal is to maximize shareholder value,so tax planning is an economic behavior that is consistent with the company's interests.However,some scholars analyze the tax planning problem from the perspective of principal-agent theory,they believe that with the separation of the two powers of modern enterprises,tax planning will provide managers with convenient conditions for self-interested encroachment on company assets and transfer of resources,which will reduce enterprise value.Therefore,this paper believes that the relationship between tax planning and corporate value should be studied from the perspective of reducing agency costs.As an effective way to ease the principal-agent problem,the management equity incentive can consider the long-term development of the enterprise and adopt a scientific tax planning scheme that is beneficial to the enterprise to enhance the enterprise value.So can management equity incentives adjust the relationship between tax planning and corporate value,so that management can enhance corporate value through tax planning? In order to explore this relationship,this paper studies the three.This paper uses the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in 2011-2017 to conduct empirical research.The results show that:The first,the increase of management equity incentive level will increase tax planning behavior and reduce corporate tax burden;under different property rights,there is a significant difference in the relationship between the two,and the positive correlation between the two is stronger in non-state enterprises.The second,tax planning will enhance corporate value;among them,the relationship between the two is not significant in state-owned enterprises,and the non-state-owned enterprises' tax planning activities can significantly enhance corporate value.The third,the management equity incentives were added to the study of the relationship between tax planning and corporate value,and management equity incentives can promote the effect of tax planning to enhance corporate value.