Study On Equity Structure And Motivate Mechanism In PPP Projects

This paper studies the establishment of equity structure and motivates mechanism between government and social capitalists in PPP project.Firstly,through the literature research method,domestic and foreign scholars discuss the current situation of PPP project financing and ownership structure,demonstrating the necessity of research on equity structure and motivate mechanism.Starting with PPP project financing,this paper expounds the main differences between project financing and corporate financing.Based on the analysis of the operation mode and the whole process of project financing,this paper discusses the financing mode of PPP project.Combining the existing theories and research results,based on the analysis of equity structure elements and selection,this paper puts forward the research direction of "the impact of reasonable equity structure on project income and the motivate significance for social capitalists".Secondly,considering the actual project situation and various factors,the dynamic game of equity structure between government and social capitalists is constructed,and the incentive effect of reasonable equity structure on social capitalists is considered from the perspective of government.The Stackelberg dynamic game model of complete information is established with the expected return of both sides as the decision objective.Through the reverse induction method,the optimal share allocation ratio of the government and the optimal effort degree of the social capitalists are obtained.Then,a numerical example is used to study the influence of system parameters on the equilibrium solution and the expected return of both sides.Then,we consider the impact of private information on the government and social capitalists.Choosing motivate factors and benchmark profits as private information,this paper explores the equity game of private information under the private ownership of government and social capitalists respectively.Assuming that private information conforms to Bernoulli distribution,Stackelberg dynamic game model is constructed to solve Nash equilibrium of sub-game.The influence of private information change on equilibrium solution and expected returns of both sides is studied by an example.Finally,combined with the latest case of PPP database rectification of the Ministry of Finance and the case of Wuhan Rail Transit Line 8 Phase 1,the empirical analysis is carried out.The potential problems in the case are excavated and analyzed from the aspects of project financing and equity structure allocation,which verifies the main investment proposals of the model study in this paper.This paper demonstrates the reference significance of the research results and investment proposals for practical projects.This paper argues that(1)when the government considers the benefits of the project with a relatively long franchise period,it should hold a large proportion of shares and control the controlling right of the project company.(2)When project profits are unstable and volatile,the government should take control of its own project profits.(3)There is an optimal range of ownership structure of PPP project.Within this interval,both sides' income can reach the optimum level under the equilibrium state.(4)The equity ratio between government and enterprise should not be too different,and should be allocated reasonably.Appropriate equity proportion adjustment can stimulate the social capitalists,promote the initiative and enthusiasm of the social capitalists through the improvement of the target income of the social capitalists,and thus promote the efficient operation of the project.