| With the development of the Internet and the sharing economy,online car-hailing have gradually entered the public's vision.In recent years,online car-hailing have occupied a certain market in China.Along with the rapid development of ride-hailing,it has also brought a series of regulatory issues.Driver's service level and passenger safety have become topics of public concern.How to reasonably and effectively supervise the driver of online car-hailing has become an urgent issue to be resolved.Based on this,the following research is carried out in this paper.Firstly,this article analyzes the current development status and future development trends of online car-hailing by using relevant data and combining the status quo;it analyzes the current status of supervision from two aspects: self-regulation of online car-hailing platforms and government supervision of the online car-hailing industry.Secondly,based on the hypothesis of bounded rationality,a game model between the online car-hailing platform and the platform driver is constructed,the stability of the local equilibrium point of the game model is analyzed,and simulation is performed using Matlab.Draw the following conclusions: As the online ride-hailing platform increases the punishment for platform drivers' illegal operations,platform drivers will tend to choose a compliant operating strategy;reducing the supervision cost of the online car-hailing platform will make the selection strategy of the online car-hailing platform evolve towards a positive supervision direction,and the selection strategy of the platform driver will evolve towards a compliant operation direction;with the increase of the government's penalties for the passive supervision of the online car-hailing platform,the online car-hailing platform will increase the supervision of the platform drivers,and the platform drivers will evolve towards compliance operation;increasing the general public's supervision of the platform and driver of the platform will help the platform selection strategy to evolve towards active supervision,and the platform driver's selection strategy will evolve towards compliance operation.Thirdly,the evolutionary game model between the ride-hailing platform and passengers is established by using the knowledge of evolutionary game theory.The stability of the local equilibrium point of the game model is analyzed using the Jacobian matrix,and simulation is performed using Matlab.The following conclusions are drawn:the online car-hailing platform should increase the support for passengers to participate isupervision,so that passengers actively cooperate with the online car-hailing platform's supervision of platform drivers;the reduction of the cost of encouraging passengers to actively cooperate with the supervision and the cost of actively cooperating with the supervision can help passengers actively participate in the supervision of the platform's drivers by the platform.Finally,based on the analysis results of the game model,conclusions and inspiration are drawn,and the shortcomings of the research in this paper are summarized,and the direction of further research in the future is pointed out. |
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