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The Study On The Identification And Regulation Of The Abuse Of Market Dominance In The Bilateral Platform Of The Online Car-hailing

Posted on:2019-06-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W J WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330542455848Subject:Industrial Economics
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After the didi chuxing platform merged its competitors,it took advantage of the market,then the price of car rental service rose significantly.In the morning rush hour,most of the premium price of didi chuxing platform and special car service was 1.5 to 2 times higher,and the taxi would have to add between 8 and 40 yuan for the dispatch fee,which aroused strong criticism from the public opinion.Some scholars put forward the the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing has mobile Internet booking,precise matching,online payment and other characteristics,which make it to a independent market,and rising price behavior has suspected abuse of dominant market position behavior.However,due to the platform has crossover network externalities,the user lock effect,which make dominant market position has particularity,then makes barriers to dominant market position and abuse of dominant market position determination,but domestic scholars have not yet solve that dilemma.This paper will uses of net profit model test method about bilateral platform for market definition,then reforms the judgement of market dominant position,build a platform for bilateral monopoly model to conclude method of identification and regulation of the abuse of market dominance in the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing and suggestions are put forward.First of all,on the issue of market definition,traditional market definition method,SSNIP is no longer applicable for the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing,This paper uses of net profit model test method to divide the market of the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing,thought to have a network reservation models and existing bilateral features,such as fast taxi and hitchhiking of the didi chuxing.Because of the non-employment system and the cross-network externality effect of the driver.Secondly,the proportion of the market share of the network is not correctly measured by the method of the share calculation of the key factors in the traditional industry.This article make standards of the identification of the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing: the calculation of bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market share should change sales amount to the customer for the measure factor,increase of proportion of dominant market position,and make full consideration about bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market ownership capital,key techniques and the technical innovation ability and other factors on the web about bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market influence the formation of dominant market position.Third,the issue of the abuse of dominant market position of the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market.this paper will identificate based on the consumer welfare standard,by building the monopoly bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market model,analysis: monopoly price,trading volume is the main factors influencing the consumer welfare in the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market;It is believed that if the change of monopoly price and trading volume leads to the transfer of consumer wealth to the monopoly platform,it can be concluded that the bilateral monopoly platform of this network has abuse of market dominance behavior.On the basis of the above analysis,this paper makes an analysis on whether the didi chuxing abuse the market dominance.First of all,the model of didi chuxing like faster car,hitchhiking,taxi belong to bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market model,but the price is even higher than that of the traditional taxi,which questioned the possibility of the existence of exploitation of consumers.Second,from the point of online car-hailing market power,didi chuxing merges kuaidi and acquisitions Uber China,then it makes high transfer cost barriers,capital barriers and technical barriers.Finally,from the point of the market behavior,the behavior of rising price is not automatically adjust based on the market,but on the platform,and dynamic premium algorithm is not transparent,did chuxin highly possible abuse dominant market position.Based on the above conclusions,this paper argues that the government should regulate the abuse of market dominance in the bilateral platform of the online car-hailing market.Firstly,using profit model test method to divide he online car-hailing market,using the nembers of coustomer to analyze the market share and paying attention to the new market barriers;Second,using the consumer welfare standard to determine whether the company has the abuse of market dominance behavior.If there is a price abuse and the consumer welfare is damaged,the abuse can be determined.Thirdly,the government should intervene in the market price regulation of the market and protect consumers' benefit,should take legal action when necessary.Finally,consumer prices and security guarantees need to be addressed.Establish and improve the system of public rights protection.
Keywords/Search Tags:bilateral platform, online car-hailing, consumer welfare, dominant market position, abuse
PDF Full Text Request
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