Research On The Impact Of Executive Incentive On Business Performance

Due to the separation of ownership and management rights of enterprises,the principal-agent problem arises.How to set up a reasonable incentive mechanism has become the focus of research.There exists the phenomenon of "large shareholder holding" in our country.The equity concentration is included in the research of executive incentive and business performance,and the research is carried out according to the property rights.From the perspective of executive incentive and equity concentration,this paper explores how to choose the right level of equity concentration under different property rights,and how to implement an effective incentive plan,so as to achieve the purpose of improving business performance.For the relationship between executive incentives and business performance,scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research and achieved a lot of research results.However,there are still differences in the selection of samples and the adoption of empirical methods,so the relationship between them needs further in-depth study.This paper uses empirical research methods and selects the data from 2013 to 2017 for five consecutive years to study the manufacturing A-share listed companies.The research finds that executive compensation incentive can promote business performance,especially in non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises.There is no quadratic curve relationship between executive equity incentive and business performance,and they are positively correlated,especially in state-owned manufacturing enterprises.The on-the-job consumption of executives has a negative impact on business performance,especially in state-owned manufacturing enterprises.In the state-owned manufacturing enterprises,the equity concentration has a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between executive compensation incentive and business performance,but not significant in the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises;In non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises,the equity concentration has a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between executive equity incentive and business performance,but it is not significant in state-owned manufacturing enterprises;In the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises,the equity concentration has a negative regulatory effect on the relationship between the on-the-job consumption of executives and business performance,but it is not significant in the state-owned manufacturing enterprises.In this paper,the relationship between executive incentive and business performance is moderated by the equity concentration,and the relationship between them is studied under the regulation of equity concentration,which provides a new research idea for the future related research.In this paper,manufacturing enterprises are divided into state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises according to the nature of property rights.The relationship between executive incentives and business performance under different property rights is highlighted.There is a gap between state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises in the formulation of incentive policies.By grouping research,the paper provides corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for state-owned manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises,which has a positive impact on the improvement of business performance.