Study On The Evolutionary Game Of Knowledge Sharing Among Enterprises From The Perspective Of Industrial Clusters

As the knowledge economy sweeps the globe,the market competition is becoming more and more complicated,and knowledge has become a strategic resource for competition among enterprises,and its importance is becoming increasingly prominent.Faced with the awakening of consumers' self-awareness,the diversified needs of consumers and the requirements for the development of a higher level of open economy,individual innovations of the “solitary heroic type” are destined to fail to provide continuous driving force for the development of technological innovation in enterprises.Quickly acquire complementary and heterogeneous knowledge,break through the ceiling of enterprise development,and companies gradually set their sights on an industrial cluster composed of upstream and downstream enterprises,competitors and scientific research institutions.As the main force driving regional economic development,industrial clusters have shortened the innovation loop and provided the possibility for the rational layout and optimal allocation of resources such as technology,products,talents,and knowledge within and between clusters.However,the cooperation between cluster enterprises is a more competitive relationship.How to stimulate the enthusiasm of knowledge sharing within the industrial cluster and reduce the barriers to knowledge sharing within the cluster is of great academic and practical significance.On the basis of analyzing industrial cluster related theories,knowledge sharing,knowledge sharing hostility,evolutionary game concepts and research review,this paper divides knowledge sharing into two types according to the direction of knowledge flow:bidirectional flow and unidirectional flow,and carries out evolutionary game analysis on them respectively.Symmetrical enterprises with the same knowledge capacity are selected as the game subject to study the bidirectional flow of knowledge.Enterprises with different knowledge abilities are selected as game subjects,and the one-way flow of knowledge is studied from the perspective of hostile behaviors of knowledge sharing.According to the flow direction of knowledge,the subject is divided into communicators and receivers,and the hostile behaviors of knowledge sharing of knowledge concealment and knowledge rejection are studied respectively.Matlab2014 a software was used to solve the variable step algorithmto simulate the assignment of the dynamic replication equtions established in this section,and the influence of variable parameter value changes on the behavior decision of knowledge sharing and the critical proportion of enterprise knowledge sharing strategy were analyzed.Through the above research process,the conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)The positive and negative benefits of the trust mechanism greatly change the benefits of both parties in the payment Matrix.On the one hand,it increases the positive benefits of knowledge sharing,and at the same time,it also increases the losses of the Party with hidden knowledge,the organizational environment of the industrial cluster can enlarge the positive and negative utility of the trust mechanism,which greatly reduces the Opportunism and free riding behavior of the members.By introducing a mechanism beyond the rules of the game to restrain both sides of the game with limited rationality,the participants tend to choose the knowledge sharing strategy in order to realize their maximum interests,and the game results can be realized by PARETO efficiency.(2)The quality level of industrial cluster and the service level of cluster function management organization affect the choice of sharing strategy by adjusting the cost and synergetic benefit of knowledge sharing.(3)The initial probability of the knowledge sharing agent selection strategy will affect not only the convergence speed of evolution,but also the direction of evolution convergence.(4)Trust utility can effectively weaken the hostility of knowledge sharing among enterprises in the industrial cluster,and this weakening effect is mainly to reduce the knowledge hiding behavior of knowledge disseminators to promote the occurrence of knowledge sharing.(5)The apprentice allowance has a significant effect on the evolution of knowledge sharing strategies,and the comprehensive coefficient of the apprentice allowance has the best range.Only within the appropriate range,the apprentice allowance can promote knowledge sharing and reduce the knowledge sharing hostility of knowledge sharers and recipients.