The Research Of Logistics Financial Supervision Risk

The development of logistics financial business can bring "win-win situation" to logistics regulatory enterprises,financing enterprises and financial institutions,but it is faced with various risks,among which regulatory risks are particularly prominent.Under the principal-agent relationship,the interests of logistics regulatory enterprises and financial institutions are not consistent,and the interests of logistics regulatory enterprises and their internal regulatory employees are different,which may lead to the emergence of regulatory risks.This paper analyzes the dynamic evolution process of the game between the logistics supervision enterprises and their supervision employees based on the difference between their interests and uses different countermeasures to optimize and control the volatility of the game process and the illegal operation of the supervision employees.The main research contents of this paper are as follows:(1)Establish an evolutionary game model for the dynamic game relationship between logistics supervision enterprises and their supervisory employees and solve the equilibrium points of the evolutionary game with the replication dynamic equation.By combining system dynamics with game model,the game simulation system of logistics supervision enterprises and their supervision employees is constructed,and the external variables of the system are reasonably assigned to verify the stability of the equilibrium point of the system(that is,the strategies of both sides of the game).(2)Carry out stability control to alleviate the risk of repeated fluctuations in the game evolution process between logistics supervision enterprises and their supervision employees,and the problem that the probability of illegal operation of supervision employees is not controllable.From the perspective of logistics regulatory enterprises,the stability control countermeasures(including incentive policies,punishment constraints and dynamic regulation)are designed to suppress the system volatility,so as to better control the regulatory risks and maximize the regulatory benefits.(3)In view of the situation that there is still some probability of illegal operation in the supervision staff under the stable state of game evolution,the stability optimization of the model can be realized by changing the relationship between variables in the model and the value,so as to alleviate the risk of illegal operation of the supervision staff.Finally,the corresponding regulatory Suggestions are given.This paper mainly draws the following conclusions:(1)Simple incentive policies have no obvious effect on mitigating regulatory risks.(2)In the general punishment constraints,increasing the punishment intensity can only have the effect of risk slow release in a short period of time.(3)Dynamic punishment constraint can better control the fluctuation of game evolution process,that is,it has a good risk stability effect,but there is still a certain proportion of probability of illegal operation of supervision staff,and the optimized dynamic punishment further alleviates the risk of illegal operation of supervision staff.(4)Simple dynamic regulation has no positive effect on easing regulatory risks,but dynamic regulation based on optimized dynamic punishment can reduce regulatory risks to the minimum.At this time,logistics regulatory enterprises should maintain a certain high regulatory probability.(5)The probability that the supervision staff’s illegal operation is discovered by the logistics supervision enterprise under high supervision,and the probability of the supervision event when the supervision staff’s illegal operation occurs,both of which have a positive effect on easing the supervision risk.