Font Size: a A A

Research On The Compliance Behavior Of Chinese State-owned Enterprises' Dividends

Posted on:2020-12-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q F LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330620456716Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the increasing profitability of state-owned enterprises,how to strengthen the design of dividend surrender system of state-owned enterprises and realize the full payment of dividends of state-owned enterprises has gradually become a hot topic.State-owned enterprises,as independent market operators,have their own interest pursuit.Under the institutional inertia of non-dividend distribution of state-owned enterprises for the past 13 years,the state,as a shareholder,begins to levy after-tax profits on state-owned enterprises,which is bound to face many difficulties and obstacles.In practice,these difficulties and obstacles are manifested in the fact that the proportion of state-owned enterprises' after-tax profits is still low,which has not reached the target of 30% set by the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee,and most of the profits that have been paid back are still returned to state-owned enterprises,which fail to realize the reform goal of state-owned enterprises' profit turning over to the state and ultimately benefiting the people's livelihood.The main reason for this problem is that our country has not yet established a rigid system to guarantee the dividend surrender of state-owned enterprises,and the state has failed to establish an effective checking and balancing mechanism for state-owned enterprises in the interest surrender of state-owned enterprises.As a result,state-owned enterprises take advantage of the information advantage of internal control and,driven by rational economic man's behavior,produce non-compliance of dividend surrender of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,in the practice of restructuring the profit surrender system of state-owned enterprises,it is necessary to explore the behavior characteristics of compliance and non-compliance in the profit surrender of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of behavioral economics,so as to build a more perfect dividend surrender system of state-owned enterprises.Firstly,on the premise of explaining the relevant literature review,theoretical basis and research category definition,this paper uses the research method of institutional economics to analyze the phased characteristics and development law of dividend surrender system of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of institutional evolution,which paves the way for the follow-up analysis from a historical perspective;secondly,based on the prospect theory,it constructs the compliance behavior model of dividend surrender of state-owned enterprises.It is found that the increase of dividend surrender ratio of state-owned enterprises will reduce the compliance degree of dividend surrender behavior of state-owned enterprises.The punishment intensity of government departments,the concern degree of state-owned enterprises for their own reputation,the disgust degree of loss,and the government's inspection degree are directly proportional to the compliance degree of dividend surrender behavior of state-owned enterprises.Thirdly,based on principal-agent theory,a game model of the behavior of government and state-owned enterprise managers is established.At present,the compliance of the dividend surrender behavior of managers in state-owned enterprises is inversely proportional to the increase of dividend surrender ratio,and is proportional to the penalty cost and incentive mechanism.Finally,the basic ideas of reform are discussed from three aspects: taking the maximization of shareholder wealth as the goal of state-owned enterprises' financial management,refining the level of the object of state-owned enterprises' profit collection,and gradually increasing the profit surrender ratio,and perfecting the dividend surrender of state-owned enterprises.Relevant supporting systems,clear positioning of the Ministry of Finance and SASAC,establishment of effective incentive and restraint mechanism,and improvement of internal and external supervision mechanism are put forward to improve the dividend payment system of state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:State-owned enterprises, dividends paid, compliance, Budget for state-owned assets
PDF Full Text Request
Related items