| The promotion and rapid development of PPP model has greatly accelerated the pace ofinfrastructure construction in China.As a new mode of government supplying public goods and providing public services,it plays an increasingly important role in the field of infrastructure investment.With the characteristics of large construction scale and long franchise period of PPP project,PPP project contract has the nature of incomplete contract.Therefore,it is necessary to explore the influence of incomplete contract on social capital.The research results of this paper can provide a theoretical basis for the the sponsor party to choose the appropriate degree of contract incompleteness before signing the contract,and put forward corresponding policy Suggestions to improve the total surplus of the society.Based on the incomplete contract theory,the degree of the incomplete contract of PPP project is measured by the cognitive effort intensity of the sponsor.The efforts made by the the sponsor party to identify possible future risks before signing the contract are called cognitive efforts.The higher the cognitive intensity,the more the signed PPP project contract can adapt to the uncertain state in the future,and the lower the probability of renegotiation to change the contract state,and the lower the incomplete degree of contract.Firstly,by establishing the cognitive model of the the sponsor party,this paper analyzes the impact of the degree of contract imperfection on the the sponsor party when the residual control rights of PPP projects belong to different subjects,and explores the cognitive intensity to maximize the benefits of the the sponsor party,so as to obtain the degree of contract imperfection that is most beneficial to the the sponsor party.Secondly,the factors affecting the cognitive strength of the sponsor and its influencing mechanism are explored.This paper analyzes the change of the cognitive strength of the sponsor in PPP projects with different attributes.Finally,this paper explores the optimal cognitive strength of society in the maximum case of total social surplus,compares it with the cognitive strength of the sponsor,and puts forward corresponding policy Suggestions to guide the sponsor to choose the optimal cognitive strength of society.The results show that when the the sponsor party has the residual control right,the cognitive deficiency occurs,and the cognitive strength chosen by the the sponsor party is lower than the social optimal cognitive strength.In the case that the government has controlright,the the sponsor side will have insufficient or excessive cognition depending on the ratio of the government’s negotiating power before and after.Environmental uncertainty is an important factor affecting the cognitive strength of the sponsor.However,the impact of environmental uncertainty on cognitive strength is affected by the moderating variable government negotiating power.Above the critical value,the cognitive strength of the sponsor increases with the increase of environmental uncertainty.Below the critical value,the cognitive strength of the sponsor first increases and then decreases with the increase of environmental uncertainty.The cognitive strength of the sponsor increases with the increase of adjustment and adaptation cost;When the government has the residual control right,the change of the government’s negotiating power will also affect the cognitive strength of the sponsor.The cognitive strength of the sponsor increases with the ratio of the government’s renegotiation power to the signing power.In addition,the cognitive strength of the the sponsor side based on its own income maximization cannot make the total surplus of the society reach the maximum value.We can guide the the sponsor side to choose the social optimal cognitive strength through the prior reward mechanism or the prior agreement renegotiation distribution mechanism. |
