Research On The Influence Of Mixed Ownership Reform Of Commercial State-owned Enterprises On Inefficient Investment

The reform of state-owned enterprises tends to be diversified and individualized,with the focus on the active development of mixed ownership.At present,through the continuous development of mixed ownership economy,state-owned listed enterprises well integrate management,efficiency,capital and other elements and make reasonable allocation to help enterprises improve their governance level and enhance their comprehensive competitiveness.Corporate investment is one of the three important contents of corporate financial activities,which has a great impact on the profitability and future development of enterprises.However,inefficient investment is a common problem in state-owned enterprises,which is not conducive to the improvement of business performance,but also leads to the unreasonable and effective allocation of social resources.Therefore,it is important to study the problem of inefficient investment in state-owned enterprises to improve the value of enterprises and promote the healthy development of national economy.Classified Governance is the foundation of successful reform of state-owned enterprises,so we should classify state-owned enterprises and promote mixed ownership in an orderly way.According to the policy requirements of SASAC and other relevant departments,the further reform of state-owned enterprises in China should begin with commercial state-owned enterprises.The important carrier of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is listed companies.The key of reform is to change the ownership structure of enterprises.In this context,this paper focuses on the inefficient investment behavior of state-owned enterprises with mixed ownership.Firstly,based on the information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,property right theory and free cash flow hypothesis,on the basis of summarizing the existing research results of scholars at home and abroad,this paper discusses the impact of non-state-owned equity ratio,the largest shareholder shareholding ratio and equity balance degree on the inefficient investment of enterprises.Then select the data of mixed ownership commercial state-owned listed companies in 2014-2018,use Richardson model to measure the explained variable "inefficient investment",carry out regression analysis through empirical method,and finally put forward corresponding policy recommendations.It is hoped that the conclusions of this paper can provide theoretical reference for the reform of state-owned enterprises in the future,and haveimportant significance for promoting the value of state-owned enterprises and the healthy development of capital market.In the mixed ownership commercial state-owned enterprises,the proportion of non-state-owned shares and the proportion of the largest shareholder have a significant negative correlation with the inefficient investment of the enterprise.Improving the proportion of shareholding can improve the level of corporate governance and alleviate the problem of inefficient investment of the enterprise;while the degree of equity balance is positively correlated with the inefficient investment of the enterprise,and the high degree of equity balance will aggravate the inefficient investment Investment.Therefore,if we want to improve the inefficient investment of commercial state-owned enterprises,we should consider optimizing the ownership structure.The suggestions of this paper are as follows: first,enterprises should continue to develop mixed ownership,increase the proportion of non-state-owned capital holdings,and promote the diversification of enterprise equity mechanism;second,maintain a moderate concentration of equity,and the proportion of the largest shareholder should not be too low;finally,enterprises should avoid excessive equity balance,and build a reasonable equity balance structure.