Research On The Value Effect Of Listed Companies' Stock Repurchase Under The Background Of Supply-side Structural Reform

Since 2017,supply-side structural reform have continued to advance,and financial risk prevention and deleveraging have been implemented,making the stock market continue to be depressed.In this context,some listed companies believe that their company's stock price is far from corporate value,and hope to use the stock repurchase to promote the company's stock market price to return to long-term intrinsic value.At the same time,in order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of employees and attract and retain outstanding talents,some companies that have carried out stock repurchase rewarded them to key employees and managers,which also made the stock market declare equity incentives.The number of listed companies has skyrocketed.Based on the background of supply-side structural reforms,this article empirically studies the impact of stock repurchase on corporate value based on wealth transfer theory,free cash flow theory,and herd effect theory.At the same time,considering the surge in equity incentives in 2017-2018,Based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of interest pooling,further study the relationship between management shareholding and corporate value in the implementation of stock repurchases in the context of supply-side structural reform.Moderating role between corporate values.This article uses 469 listed companies that have announced and repurchased A shares in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from2017 to 2018 by using centralized bidding as research samples.Using multiple regression methods,this paper empirically tests both stock repurchases and corporate value.The relationship between them is discussed,and the role played by management shareholding in the relationship between the two is discussed.The research results show that after the supply-side structural reform,the share repurchase of listed companies has a negative correlation with corporate value;for listed companies implementing stock repurchases,the management shareholding ratio has a positive correlation with corporate value;management shareholding can adjust The negative effect of stock repurchase oncorporate value.The above research conclusions have once again verified the related theory of capital structure.Because of the difference between the implementation of stock repurchase and the disposal of stock repurchase,it affects the company's property rights ratio and affects corporate value through different degrees of leverage.Therefore,this article proposes that,in the context of supply-side structural reforms,listed companies should rationally implement stock repurchases to avoid blind market follow-up;use the destroy strategy of stock repurchase carefully;try to use the repurchased shares as management's equity incentive.The research in this article has enriched the research literature in the field of stock repurchase,and also provided a new reference for the stock repurchase decision of listed companies in the context of supply-side reform.