Bernard Williams, Wittgenstein, and idealism: A critique of Williams' case for an idealistic reading of Wittgenstein's later philosophy

Bernard Williams suggests that the later Wittgenstein can be read as endorsing an idealism parallel to the solipsism he endorsed in his early work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In this essay I argue that Williams' case is weak because it rests on his mistaken claim that the later Wittgenstein, like the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus , endorses a theory of meaning.;I then consider whether any support for the kind of idealistic reading Williams motivates can be found in the later work, in lieu of any support to be proffered by Williams himself. I argue that a pronounced discomfort of the later Wittgenstein's with the notion of 'pre-linguistic facts' does support Williams' general claim that Wittgenstein may be inclined toward idealism. However, I argue that the variety of idealism that this evidence points towards is, contra Williams' reading, not one that bears significant structural similarities to the solipsism of the Tractatus.