The 'anti-bureaucratic revolution': The Yugoslav state elites' perception of and their reaction to the Serbian nationalist movement of 1988--1989

Why do some regimes counter mass movements that strive to oust them with all of their repressive capacities, while other yield with little or no resistance? Could part of the explanation lay in different experiences with social movements and with applying repression against the masses that those regimes' political elites have acquired through their specific historical developments? Could such a lack of experience then cause some regimes to perceive mass movements, once they mobilize against them, as being more spontaneous and more popular than they really are, thus also stronger and less feasible to counter? I explore these questions by analyzing the cases of the political elites of four Yugoslav federal units that found themselves under the onslaught of the so-called "anti-bureaucratic revolution," a Serbian and Montenegrin nationalist populist movement, in 1988-89. I found support for the hypothesized influence that the political elites' relative inexperience with dealing with social movements and with applying repression against the masses influenced their reaction to the "anti-bureaucratic revolution." However, contrary to my speculations, that influence did not seem to operate through affecting their perception and interpretation of the behavior of the movement participants (at protest rallies) in terms of movement's spontaneity and popularity.;However, I was also interested in what factors influence the behavior of the lower-level political elites in such circumstances. Under which conditions will they break their loyalty to the regime (that is, to the highest political elites of their political system, their political superiors)? My research suggests that the lower-level political elites tend to engage in rational-choice calculation on whether and to what extent to break their loyalty to the regime by supporting the oppositional movement materially and organizationally. The lower-level political elites seem to base their calculation upon the perception of the determination of their political superiors to cling to power, which is indicated by whether or not the latter threaten and/or apply repression against the movement. The motivation behind this rational-choice calculation of the lower-level political elites seems to be to maximize the chances that one would remain within the ranks of political elites in the future, no matter whether under the old regime or under the new one that might be established by the oppositional movement, if victorious.