| This dissertation strives to understand Aristotle's presentation of moral virtue in his Nicomachean Ethics. The pivotal question of that presentation is how one determines what the content of virtue is. Aristotle's account of the various moral virtues reveals certain standards by which the virtuous person takes his bearings, foremost among these the good of one's political community. But he does not say that virtue is determined by such things, and he is reluctant even to mention them.;Ultimately, he concludes that virtue is determined by phronesis (prudence). However, his account of prudence fails to provide a wholly satisfying explanation of how prudence determines what virtue is, since the judgments made by prudence are found to depend upon virtue. Thus, the reader is forced to ask why Aristotle refuses to define virtue in terms of the ends toward which it is ordered. On the one hand, I argue that this approach increases the appeal of moral virtue to the gentleman. But once one recognizes the difficulty, one is forced to reconsider Aristotle's teaching on virtue as a whole, including its relationship to happiness.;The last chapter of the dissertation considers wisdom, the virtue paired with prudence in Book VI. I argue that the wise person is aware of and corrects the defect in prudence to which Aristotle had pointed. The thesis concludes with a comparison of the wise person and the morally virtuous person, and considers how Aristotle's appreciation of the contemplative life may inform his presentation of moral virtue. |
