| Somalia has been in conflict since January 1991. The approach to explaining the conflict has generally followed the Hobbesian and Schmittian dichotomy with little discussion of institutional failure as a contributing factor. I argue the conflict in South Central Somalia is not among clans. There are three key factors explaining the protraction of South Central conflict. First, the power-sharing model that has been applied in Somali reconciliation conferences since 1991 assumes that the conflict is among clans who are unitary actors; thus, giving all major clans a stake in "an-all-inclusive" transitional governments is thought to be the solution to the conflict. Power-sharing agreements, however, have intensified intraclan struggle for power. Second, the losers of power-sharing agreements have formed alliances of convenience that transcend clans to undermine reconciliation conferences or transitional government that is formed. Third, traditional leaders and informal rules have not been a factor in the success of Somaliland and Puntland, the two most stable regions in Somalia. Rather, their success was the result of the emergence of a dominant group that completed the "state-making" process (Tilly 1980). Hence, I argue, the dominant group model is a better alternative to the power-sharing model to explain stability (Puntland and Somaliland) and persistent conflict (South Central Somalia). |
