Subordinate state: A history of Soviet-East German relations during key Cold War crises

Recently the degree of subordination of East Germany to the Soviet Union during the Cold War has been the subject of great debate amongst historians. Hope Harrison has introduced the notion that East Germany was able to "wag the Soviet dog's tail," and was therefore able to maintain a relatively large degree of autonomy throughout the course of their alliance from 1949 to 1989. She uses the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 to illustrate the level of East German autonomy. Harrison argues that the leader of the Socialist Unity Party, Walter Ulbricht, played a decisive role in pressuring the Soviets to agree to the construction of the Wall as a means to put an end to the mass exodus of East Germans. Ultimately, she claims that East German officials recognized the strategic value of the GDR to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, thus they were able to manipulate the Soviet Union into conceding to their various political demands by exploiting the poor economic situation of the GDR.; Hope Harrison's argument has caused historians to reevaluate the nature of Soviet-East German relations. This thesis will present a historiography, which will deal with key works that address the complex nature of soviet-East German relations. It will also provide a framework for measuring the validity of Harrison's argument by setting her thesis against several events that took place throughout the Cold War, including the Berlin Crisis, the Czechoslovakian Crisis (Solidarity, 1968) and Solidarity (1980-1981), when East German officials pleaded for the Soviet Union to invade Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively. This thesis will discuss whether Soviet decisions during these cases were effected by the opinions of East German officials. Ultimately, the paper will contextualize Harrison's assertion of an East Germany that was able to force the Soviet agenda.