| The implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) brought about a new national system of high stakes accountability in which federal legislation, tied to federal dollars, attaches student performance levels to severe, though graduated, sanctions inviting stigma at both the district and school-levels. Given the federalist structure of the education in the United States, state bodies have traditionally controlled educational funding and school performance standards for their own localities, with finance reform generally targeting cross-district equity. In order to avoid the stigmas associated with failure on state standards tests, states may direct aid to low-performing schools and districts. This study incorporates data for five states, two of which have had pre-existing school finance reform. I use these data, spanning from two years preceding NCLB until 2006, to assess whether or not a significant correlations exists between student performance on standardized tests and per-pupil spending, contributing to a potential explanation for differences in spending patterns after the implementation of the law. These evaluations are based on state reporting of student performance and the department of education's Common Core of Data (CCD) documenting of per-pupil spending and enrollment by district. Through the use of a fixed effects model within states over the course of the time period selected, I find that overall there is not statically significant relationship between per-pupil spending and student performance data, though there is a statistically significance difference in spending across states with each progressive year after the implementation of NCLB. |
