Truthmaker theory and its applications

I examine the concept of truthmaking and it applications within metaphysics and philosophy of religion.;In Chapter one, I provide an overview of the truthmaking literature, and I highlight where my dissertation makes contributions.;In Chapter two, I look at several foundational issues relevant to truthmaking. These include how to understand the truthmaking relation, the nature of truthbearers, Truthmaker Maximalism, Truth Supervenes on Being, and the implications of truthmaking for the debate between nominalists and realists.;In Chapter three, I assess David Armstrong's attempt to find truthmakers modal truths. I argue his position faces several problems. One difficulty is that he is unable to ground the possibility of alien entities. Another is that his position implies that it is possible for an electron to be positively charged. Last, he cannot ground various necessary truths.;I start off Chapter four by arguing that theism provides a way to address some of Armstrong's problems. It provides a way to ground the possibility of alien entities, as well as the possibility of the laws of nature being different. After thinking about some of the benefits of a theistic metaphysic, I turn to exploring the theist's sovereignty-aseity intuitions. Regarding divine aseity, I look at recent attempts to use truthmaking to uphold the doctrine of divine simplicity. I argue that there are reasons stemming from the nature of truthbearers to uphold, at most, a scaled back version of the simplicity thesis. As for divine sovereignty, I begin by looking at a recent account developed by Hugh McCann, but I argue that it does not give agents enough control over their decisions.;To make further progress on divine sovereignty, in Chapter Five, I explore the extent to which one can use truthmaking considerations to reject theories. I begin by looking at the truthmaking objection to presentism. I develop both a theistic and a non-theistic response to it. I then turn back to the theist's sovereignty intuitions by looking at the truthmaking objection to Molinism. I argue that the problem with the Molinist's ungrounded counterfactuals is that it is hard to see how God can know them.