| Ever since it was known that Hong Kong would become the Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, there has been increasingly growing concern over the protection of freedom in this oriental city. One burning issue is freedom of the press. The anxiety is, however, not confined to the fear that the new sovereign might rule Hong Kong under an iron fist. Rather, many believe that the scope of freedom is shrinking due to the practice of self-censorship, a mechanism of anticipatory avoidance of sanctions. Current studies show that this phenomenon is epidemic and endemic. This thesis adopts an interpretative approach by asking—what does self-censorship mean to Hong Kong at this political and historical juncture? It argues that self-censorship is a strategic game of coordination where both the rulers and the subjects are locked in an antagonistic but interdependent partnership. Under this condition of marked inequality of bargaining power and impossibility of negotiation, the aim of this game is to utilize the fear and desire of each other so as to avoid any adverse consequence to oneself by harming the other. Though the game is constrained by historical conditions, the rules are vacillating and evolving in the legal, political and economic fronts. And the press has to navigate its course through the fluid boundaries. Through analyzing free press principles, outlining the rules of this game from various fronts, examining the press reaction, and studying foreign experiences, this thesis concludes that the crux of the self-censorship debate has moved beyond the conceptual and evidential stages. The present concern should be focused on how to keep the dynamic of the game alive through the use of voice and silence at all levels. |
