| The general aim of this study is to revive the analysis of language in legal theory by reevaluating Ronald Dworkin's critique of Herbert Hart's "open texture" argument. The specific aims of this study fall into two categories: (1) expository and (2) analytic. The expository aims are: first, to show how the semantics-pragmatics distinction applies to legal theory; second, to sketch Hart's theory, its influences and his argument that difficult legal cases arise from vagueness or open texture in legal language; and, three, to describe Dworkin's criticisms of Hart and the legal positivists' "semantic" theories. The analytic aims are: one, to partially defend Hart's theory by proving that some difficult legal cases do reduce to disagreements over how to clarify language; two, to reveal the weakness of Dworkin's critique by demonstrating that Hart's theory is not thoroughly semantic in character; and, three, to effectively blur the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. |
