Victory in Red: An analysis of the Red commanders on the southern front of the Russian Civil War, 1918-191

This thesis attempts to demonstrate that the Red military commanders in south Russia during the Civil War were competent and skillful operational leaders. As such, it attempts to correct the majority of Russian Civil War literature, which portrays the Red commanders as hopelessly outclassed by their White counterparts. In short, the 'problem' (or question) is to determine the quality of the Red commanders, and thus to assess their contribution to the ultimate Red victory. In order to examine this question, this thesis focuses on the orders and directives of the Red Army relating to the forces fighting in south Russia in 1918 and 1919. Using this data, and a definition of operational skill for commanders derived from Clausewitz and other sources, the results point to a surprisingly high level of skill for the Red commanders in the south. The Red commanders proved to be a varied group of operational leaders, not unlike most groups of military commanders found in war. In any case, these commanders were certainly the equal---if not the better---of their White opponents. These results, at a minimum, ask us to reconsider the popular notion that the Bolshevik victory was pre-determined by a Red superiority in strength and resources that overcame a weakness in military leadership---certainly the skill of the Red military leaders made a major contribution to the Bolshevik's ultimate triumph.