| The conventional wisdom on Canada's role in the Cuban missile crisis is that it was a political debacle. Yet, when reconsidered from a different perspective, the crisis becomes a more significant event in our history, and one whose lessons remain valid. Of these, Diefenbaker's refusal to acknowledge the importance of military issues outside domestic politics should stand as a reminder of the consequences of abusing civil-military relations. Through a series of errors and political misperceptions during the crisis it became apparent that the mechanism for maintaining effective civil control of the military had failed. Even though Harkness and military leaders tried to improvise, the system was incapable of exercising operational control of the forces in a crisis. Only the determined efforts of the operational commanders prevented a fiasco. In the process, however, the strength of the military relationship with the Americans was criticized and condemned. By isolating himself and his government from the Canadian military, Diefenbaker changed the basic nature of civil-military relations in Canada. Rather than integrating the military into the fabric of Canadian society, as one would expect in a liberal democracy, he widened the gulf between them. The 1964 reorganization of the national headquarters restored effective civil control of the military and allowed the military to become part of society again. The Cuban missile crisis thus became a turning point in Canadian civil-military relations. |
