| The subject of this thesis is the distinction between philosophy and the experimental sciences. The part of the problem studied, is chiefly centred on the confusion which exists between the legitimate field of research of the philosophy of nature, and the legitimate orbit of the experimental sciences. The separation of these two intellectual disciplines engenders an examination of the approach of each to sensible reality, their methods of investigation, and the types of knowledge which they achieve.;The cause of traditional philosophy was eclipsed, but not annihilated. The result has been a major division. On the one hand, the advocates of Thomism, together with such prominent men of science as Caldin, Conant, Owen, and Thompson have acknowledged the aim and validity of traditional philosophy. On the other hand, the materialists, pragmatists, and positivists rejected traditional philosophy and preferred to found their philosophies on the theories of science. It has been at this point, in order to salvage any possibility of a philosophy anchored to reality, that Maritain and his contemporaries have expanded and applied a study of the nature of philosophy and the natural sciences, so that it would be possible to separate them, and place each one in its particular position in a well ordered hierarchy of knowledge.;The problem, in its major aspect, is primarily historical, since the majority of the scholars preceding Galileo directed their efforts toward the solving of the riddles of the universe mainly by philosophical speculation; whereas, with the complete enunciation of the experimental method, the moderns sought to discover the truth contained in reality by the scientific method. Since they were unaware that the new method was limited to the observable and measurable, they firmly believed that they had discovered a new means for philosophical speculation. As was inevitable, the limits of scientific knowledge were defined by scientists such as Mach and Poincare. Unfortunately, they chose to reject the possibility of any knowledge which did not lie within the scope of the experimental method. |
