MARXISM, SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY: A CRITIQUE OF ALTHUSSER

Althusser's structuralist approach to ideology and science is problematic because it does decenter working class practice. His account is structuralist because (a) it describes society in terms of structures; (b) it interprets causality as structural determination, and (c) it decenters human activity from its role in constituting society. His theory of ideology uses structuralism to oppose economic determinism and humanism as well as to provide a replacement for a psychologistic approach to ideology as a problem of cognition rather than practice. Althusser's theory fails to avoid economic determinism, however, because his abstract functionalist account of ideology as the reproduction of capitalist relations of production interprets ideology in terms of correspondence with an economic base. He ignores the internal relations between social levels and the contradictory nature of production as valorizatione. Working class ideology is seen one-sidedly as conservative, and thus Althusser cannot explain the development of revolutionary consciousness. His view must be replaced by a theory which interprets ideology as a phase of alienated working class activity; focusing on working class practice provides an explanation of the transition to revolutionary consciousness missing in Althusser. Also, the practice view, which sees concept and object as internally related dimensions of material life activity, avoids traditional materialism and dualism which Althusser's theory does not. This analysis avoids humanism by focusing on collective class action.;Althusser's theory of ideology and his sharp distinction between concept and object can only be understood through his philosophy of science. His attack on empiricism is incoherent unless viewed as an anti-justificationist argument. Althusser opposes the justificationist tendencies to see knowledge as certainty, to sharply distinguish between theoretical language and observation language, and to see the development of knowledge as a continuous process. It is justificationism that tries to guarantee the truth of a theory and provide knowledge a foundation in reality. Althusser's dualism is an expression of his belief that concept and object must be sharply distinguished with the context of justification. His epistemological break thesis is a discontinuist position and signifies his extreme stand on theory-ladeness. Althusser places great reliance on the autonomy of mature science and the epistemic significance of theoretical criticism. Rationality is gained and knowledge progresses historically through an internal process of elaborating and criticizing concepts. Science is relatively autonomous from working class political activity. Althusser's claim that science can be validated internally, however, is wrong because it ignores the importance of external conceptual criticism and empirical investigation. His position on discontinuity must be replaced by an internal relationist theory which identifies the identities between science and ideology as well as the differences.;Althusser's theory is inadequate because theoretical criticism is necessary but insufficient for the advancement of knowledge; such critiques must always be preceded by and supplemented with transformative practical criticism. The presence of ideology should be viewed as a practical problem that can be resolved only through collective class action. According to the practice view, science is not autonomous but internally related to capitalist production. In capitalism, science exists in a form that is alienated from the immediately material and practical phase of the capitalist labor process. Althusser's account is ideological because it grasps only the phenomenal form of the existence of science and ideology under capitalism.