| In the last decade, Jurgen Habermas has developed the outlines of a "communicative ethics" as a part of his work on language, action, and reason. This dissertation assesses the implications of this aspect of Habermas's thought for a traditional problem in political philosophy: What is the relationship between reason and the justice of, and obligation to, basic political norms? Can such norms and obligations be objects of rational choice, or must our acceptance of them rest ultimately on traditions or rationally unjustifiable decisions? One dimension of this question involves the concept of rationality, and in recent years this has been the subject of intense debate. Habermas's ideas on language, action, and reason shed new light on this topic. His "discursive" conception of practical rationality offers a possible foundation for ethics and political philosophy different from that of either of the two presently dominant conceptions: strategic rationality and context rationality. The first is the universal, value-neutral reason of the individual utility maximizer which has played a central role in utilitarianism and contractarianism. The second conception, often associated with the work of Peter Winch, holds reason to be determined by social context; hence rational standards of justice will always have a relativistic validity. I argue that these prevailing views have serious drawbacks if one attempts to build a political philosophy exclusively upon them. Given these drawbacks, I maintain that Habermas's idea of a "rational consensus" attained in "practical discourse" offers a promising alternative. On the most general level, it has two advantages: (1) unlike the strategic conception, it is not absolutely ethically neutral; and (2) unlike context rationality, it is not totally relativistic, but instead holds open the possibility of maintaining some of the universalist heritage of Western political thought upon new foundations. Moreover, these advantages are not purchased, as some critics have charged, at the cost of accepting an authoritarian doctrine of the 'rational' or 'real will.'.;The latter portion of the dissertation explicates the relationship of communicative ethics to Habermas's ideas on moral development, his project for a "reconstruction of historical materialism," his thesis of a "legitimation crisis," and his perception of the role of critical social theory. In conclusion, some suggestions are offered about the sort of political orientation one can derive from Habermas. |
