Arms control agreements: A quantitative analysis

Arms control agreements are means of regulating the international production, transfer and use of weapons. The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the arms control phenomenon by examining in a rigorous, quantitative manner the military and political environment surrounding the introduction of the treaties in the period 1816-1987. The thesis uses formal statistical analysis to examine military and enmity developments preceding and following arms control agreements. I uncover differences in the pattern of military spending and international conflict across two broadly defined types of treaties. Treaties that prepare for war by establishing humanitarian rules for its conduct ("war" treaties such as the Hague Treaty of 1907) and treaties that aim at promoting peace by controlling the level and quality of armaments ("peace" treaties such as the Naval Treaty of 1922).;The main empirical findings include: "peace" treaties tend to be introduced in periods of low military spending relative to "war" treaties; military spending experiences a decrease (increase) in the short run before a "peace" ("war") treaty. While both types of treaties seem effective in restraining military expenditures in the short run (three years) after the treaty, these gains are short lived with reversal to a pattern of military buildups in the longer run. Similarly, "peace" treaties tend to both follow and be followed by low levels of international tensions (as reflected in serious disputes) relative to "war" treaties.;I also study how the level of tensions in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union (measured by the Conflict and Peace Data Bank) influences the timing of the signing of an arms control agreement. I establish that while a moderate level of tensions does not hinder arms control initiatives at all, serious tensions and disputes exert a significant adverse effect on the probability of occurrence of an arms control agreement. Moreover the signing of an arms control agreement does not produce any tangible lowering of tension between the superpowers relative to the level observed before the treaty.;Finally, I investigate the determinants of military spending in the two superpowers for the post World War II period. While both political and economic factors played a significant role in the United States, mostly political factors were operative in the Soviet Union. There is some evidence however, that economic factors become relevant in the Soviet Union in the longer run.