POLICY-MAKING OF JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1965--1983

This thesis explores the official development assistance (ODA) relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea during the period 1965 through 1983. The thesis has two frames of reference, the first, a comparative foreign policy of economic assistance to explain the contents, motives and goals of Japanese policy in offering governmental loans to the ROK, and those of the ROK policy in receiving them. The second frame of reference is to compare governmental decision-making process in both countries, to study the participants and their behavior.;In terms of our basic framework, we observe that (1) Japanese security interests in the ROK are more important than other governmental loans recipients in the national actor mode; (2) Historic cross-national connections tend to dominate the political mode, perhaps leading to an unusual amount of corruption; and (3) partly because of these factors, processes within and between organizations are somewhat distinctive--in particular, the Foreign Ministry is more influential and the Finance Ministry less so. It is argued that the great bulk of Japanese governmental loans decisions is dominated by bureaucratic agencies and stable routines. I argue that the ROK case is exceptional: both the national actor and political modes are more important, and the organizational process mode explains much less. (Abstract shortened with permission of author).;This thesis focuses on behaviors of state and non-state actors of the ROK and Japan in the decision-making process involved in the giving and accepting of Japanese governmental loans. We can observe three "modes" of decision making. The first is the "national actor" mode, which consists of rational calculations of the national interest. Decisions result essentially from problem solving. In the second, "organizational process," refers to decisions produced 'automatically' by bureaucratic standard operating processes in one organization, or through routine interactions among organizations. And the third mode, "political" mode, decisions are the result of conflicts among actors pursuing their own interests, and depend partly on the extent of their power. These three modes provide a framework for understanding decision-making about Japanese government loans to the ROK. In fact, the existing literature that deals with the governmental loans relationship between Japan and the ROK falls rather neatly into these categories.