| The thesis explores the operation of two of administrative law's main tools with regard to the activities of the Ontario Securities Commission. Accordingly, the ability to apply the rules of natural justice (and its modern form of the doctrine of procedural fairness), and the ultra vires rule is examined. The regulatory environment of securities regulation is one characterised by both its speed of change and by its complexity. Thus, the concern is to analyse whether administrative law's traditional tools can be utilised to legitimate Commission action.;It is contended that the court model and administrative law's tools fail to capture the subtleties and complexities of Commission action, and at best, confer only formal legitimacy. The thesis, therefore, explores attempts to reinvigorate the traditional model, by an examination of recent literature on the subject. The problems and possibilities of these insights are analysed. An attempt is made to suggest that the problems of legitimation through the application of a set of simple general rules to an environment of complexity and specificity, may be avoided by focusing our attention on the relationship between the administrative agency and its "constituency". (Abstract shortened by UMI.). |
