ALBANIA AND CHINA 1962-1978: A CASE STUDY OF A BILATERAL UNEQUAL ALLIANCE

The main thesis of this study is that a Small Power, such as Albania, with a potentially significant ideological, political, and strategic contribution to the competition between Great Powers, may be able to extract considerable concessions from a prospective Great Power ally, and manipulate the latter more effectively than vice versa.; Albania's alliance with China is evaluated in terms of such factors as nationalism, security, foreign aid, status and prestige, ideology, and personal power considerations of the Albanian governing elite. This study shows that Albania extracted considerable concessions from China and that the benefits of the alliance for Albania outweighed the costs. Although Tirane was emphatically the weaker partner, the scope of China's decision-making participation in Albania was insignificant. Thus Albania was not a mere client but a full-fledged partner in the alliance. Even when the apparent costs of the alliance for the PRC outweighed the benefits, Albania enjoyed the benefits of the alliance because China was unwilling to accept the political losses attendant upon Tirane's defection. Albania's defiance of China and the breakup of the alliance show that Small Powers have more room for maneuver than is often assumed.; The first chapter provides a historical background of Albania's search for security in light of its Small Power status. The second chapter evaluates the main determinants of the formation of the Albanian-Chinese alliance.; The evolution of the alliance and the impact of ideology and systemic factors on alliance cohesion are analyzed in the next two chapters. The fifth chapter deals with Albanian-Chinese economic and military interaction and its effect on alliance maintenance.; The final chapter recounts the emergence of political and ideological differences between Albania and China and surveys the developments that led to the disintegration of the alliance.