| With the continuous development of productivity and science and technology,the environment is seriously damaged and the surplus value of resources is wasted,and more and more enterprises begin to establish recycling and remanufacturing systems.With the enhancement of consumers’ environmental awareness,it has become a trend for enterprises to invest in carbon emission reduction.Based on this,this paper,considering consumer preferences and using Stackelberg game theory,aims at the problems of high investment cost of carbon emission reduction,retailer’s "free-rider" behavior and "double marginal effect" in the closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)system with company A as the core,puts forward two equity cooperation strategies of retailer holding shares and cross-holding shares,and studies the production decision-making and coordination of the CLSC of company A under different equity cooperation strategies.Firstly,based on the problems existing in the CLSC operation of company A,the centralized and decentralized CLSC decision-making models of company A before and after carbon emission reduction investment are constructed.By comparing and analyzing the optimal decision-making and maximum profit of enterprises,It is found that the carbon emission reduction of company A is beneficial to reduce the carbon emission of products,improve the recycling rate of waste products,the market demand,and the overall profits of company A,retailer and CLSC.Retailer benefit from carbon emission reduction of company A,that is,retailer "hitchhike" and "high threshold" of carbon emission reduction investment will reduce the enthusiasm of company A to invest in carbon emission reduction.Secondly,aiming at the above problems,this paper puts forward the equity cooperation strategy of retailer holding company A carbon emission reduction investment,constructs the CLSC decision model of retailer holding shares,and obtains the optimal recycling,emission reduction and pricing decisions of enterprises.By comparing the optimal decisions and maximum profits of company A and retailer before and after retailer holding shares,it is found that retailer holding company A’s carbon emission reduction investment can eliminate retailer’ "free riders" and share the carbon emission reduction investment of company A.Improve the enthusiasm of implementing carbon emission reduction.However,the retailer’s shareholding strategy can’t eliminate the "double marginal effect" brought by decentralized decision-making.On this basis,this paper designs a two part tariff contract and puts forward the conditions for realizing CLSC coordination.Finally,the production decision-making and coordination model of CLSC under the cross-shareholding strategy of company A and retailer is constructed.By comparing and analyzing the optimal decision-making and profit changes of enterprises under different shareholding modes,the applicable scope of different shareholding strategies is obtained.The research shows that under certain conditions,cross-shareholding can strengthen exchanges and cooperation among enterprises,improve the decision-making efficiency and performance level of enterprises,and eliminate the problem of retailer’ "free rider".Signing the two part tariff contract on the basis of cross-shareholding improves the efficiency of system decision-making and makes it centralized.In addition,no matter what kind of equity cooperation mode,the enhancement of consumers’ awareness of environmental protection is always conducive to improving the decision-making efficiency and performance level of enterprises and CLSC.Compared with cross-shareholding,the scope of application of retailer depends on the specific shareholding ratio,and enterprises can choose the shareholding method according to their own characteristics.Through the construction of the model and the comparative analysis of related conclusions,The related theories are applied to the operation of CLSC of company A to provide reference for the production decision-making and coordination of CLSC of company A under different equity cooperation strategies. |