Research On The Legal Regulation On Executive Compensation Of Listed Companies In China

China’s listed companies are typical enterprises with the separation of ownership and control.In recent years,the "sky high" salary of the executives of listed companies has become the focus of the society.No matter the economic crisis or the declining trend of the same industry,the executives of these listed companies still receive super-high standard salary,which once caused heated discussion until the public anger.Due to the imperfection of the existing laws in China,the management has unreasonable super high salary for various reasons.Compared with the developed countries of European and American market economy,the legal system of Companies in our country started later,and the research on executive compensation of listed companies has been a lot in the economic field.The legal field and legal regulations are also in the embryonic stage of the "sky high" compensation case of Ping An company in 2008.The lack of independence of compensation decision-making mechanism leads to the situation of "self determined compensation" of senior executives.Under the mode of "one share dominating" Chinese company,the pre compensation case of shareholders is also the manifestation of "self determined compensation",and the opinions of small and medium shareholders on compensation have no substantive significance.In addition,many executives in the incentive compensation temptation to conduct short-term high-risk behavior or financial illegal behavior,seriously damaging the interests of listed companies.In contrast,the legal regulation of executive compensation of Listed Companies in European and American countries with advanced market economy has been in a mature state since 2000.For example,the introduction of small and medium-sized shareholders’ voting rights on executive compensation to monitor the reasonableness of the amount of executive compensation,the definition of the recovery scope of the recovery mechanism of improper payment of compensation and the adoption of independent director system by the compensation committee can be used as a reference.In our country,the problem of short-term incentive distortion can also be expanded through the advanced foreign legislative model to expand the legal thinking of our country’s law on executive compensation.The legal regulation of executive compensation in listed companies is a problem that cannot be solved from an economic perspective.We need to find and analyze problems from the legal level,and strive to explore reasonable legal regulations to regulate executive compensation in Listed Companies in China,so as to make sure that there is a legal basis for the excessive executive compensation in listed companies and the system to follow when encountering problems.This paper is divided into five chapters:the first chapter is the introduction,which mainly explains the reason of the topic,the research status and research methods.The second chapter defines the basic concepts involved in the legal regulation of executive compensation,and puts forward the necessity of legal regulation.The third chapter analyzes the legislative practice of executive compensation of Listed Companies in foreign advanced market economy countries and summarizes the experience of some countries for reference on the way of legislation in China.The fourth chapter reflects the current situation of executive compensation of Listed Companies in China through data,and analyzes the problems of unreasonable compensation mechanism caused by the lack of laws in China,the lack of independent compensation committee,the recovery mechanism of improper payment of compensation,the right of shareholders to intervene in executive compensation and the status quo of equity incentive.The fifth chapter,combined with the previous chapters,puts forward suggestions for the improvement of the author of the laws and regulations on executive compensation of Listed Companies in China.