Based On Evolutionary Game Analysis On Solving The Difficulties Of Small And Medium-sized Enterprises’ Credit Financing

Difficulties in SMEs credit financing have always plagued China’s economic development,and it is also a hot issue that society and individuals pay more attention to.In recent years,my country has formulated a series of policies to promote the development of small and medium-sized enterprises,but it has to be admitted that there is still a conflict between a large number of idle social funds and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises that cannot get investment.Commercial banks in my country prefer to lend to large enterprises even if the interest rate is low,but not to small and medium enterprises,thus restricting the development of small and medium enterprises.The financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises have become a stumbling block that hinders the advancement of my country’s economy.Therefore,a timely solution to the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises can promote the rapid development of my country’s economy better and faster.But at present,there are a lot of studies that believe that there are many reasons for the difficulty of financing for SMEs in my country,including the internal performance of SMEs such as imperfect internal management,improper accounting records,and insufficient sense of responsibility of legal representatives.And in the past,small and medium-sized enterprises did not repay frequently.Banks believed that small and medium-sized enterprises had higher risk coefficients and other external manifestations.On the basis of these problems,the central bank and the government have established a series of measures,such as targeted reduction of loan interest rates and provision of guarantees for small and medium-sized enterprises,but the results have been minimal,and they have not solved the financing dilemma of small and medium-sized enterprises from the root cause.In order to solve the financing dilemma of small and medium-sized enterprises,it is necessary to find the real reason for the financing dilemma of small and medium-sized enterprises.Through static game observation,it is found that there are two reasons.The first problem is that small and medium-sized enterprises are unwilling to repay.In static analysis,small and medium-sized enterprises have higher returns if they do not repay.Therefore,after the bank borrows,they will secretly change their strategy into non-repayment.Second,there is no corresponding punishment mechanism for SMEs not repaying loans.After SMEs secretly change their strategies,there is no corresponding mechanism to punish them.On the contrary,it encourages the bad trend of SMEs not repaying loans.In the long-term dynamic game observation,the overall situation of the market is not optimal.For this reason,the market representing the success of the company is introduced as the third game party,and the penalty mechanism is added to enter the new game observation.It is found that reputation value is indeed a key factor affecting SME loans.When the reputation value is large,the overall optimal solution appears.In the end,we believe that solving the SME credit financing dilemma requires everyone to work together.Banks must impose unreasonable loan interest rates on different companies,increase reputation penalties,and increase the "contingent" costs of companies’ loan applications,and then return them after repayment.The government should help banks establish a reputation penalty system in the external environment,improve laws and regulations,and provide incentive policies when necessary.As a party applying for a loan,an enterprise should reasonably control the funds it needs,comply with market rules,and strengthen its own credit management and the credit status of legal person managers.