Research On Demand Information Sharing Based On Price And Service Competition In E-commerce Environment

With the rapid development of e-commerce,consumers can buy products from both traditional retailer and e-retailer.In order to grab market share and increase profits,there are fierce price competition and service competition between traditional retailer and e-retailer.On the other hand,traditional retailer and e-retailer can obtain the forecast information of market demand through data mining and other information technologies,so how to make the two retailers share the forecast information of demand reasonably and realize profit maximization becomes increasingly important.Therefore,based on the dual competition of price and service,this paper studies the demand information sharing of traditional retailer and e-retailer with different market shares in Nash game and Stackelberg game,respectively.For each game scenario,the mathematical decision-making models of price and service between traditional retailer and e-retailer with non-information and information sharing are firstly established.Then it analyzes and compares the optimal pricing,service level and ex ante profit before information sharing between traditional retailer and e-retailer.Finally,the choices of optimal information sharing strategy for two retailers are given,and the influences of key parameters on ex ante profit are obtained through numerical analysis.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)For each game scenario,the conditions for traditional retailers and e-retailers to implement information sharing and non-information sharing are given.(2)In the two game scenarios,the ex ante profit of retailer with a large market share after information sharing is higher than the ex ante profit without information sharing,while the ex ante profit of retailer with a small market share after information sharing is lower than the ex ante profit without information sharing.(3)No matter which game scenario the traditional retailer and e-retailer take part in,the ex ante profits of the two retailers always decrease with the increase of service cost coefficient and service competition intensity,but increase with the increase of price competition intensity.