A Two-stage Game Research On Collaborative Innovation Of Construction Industry Under The Guidance Of The Government

With the advent of the low-carbon economy era,the construction industry is facing the need for low-carbon transformation.As the demand side of low-carbon technological innovation,construction companies have the inherent motivation for technological innovation,but limited by their own R&D capabilities and innovation input costs,it is difficult to independently complete low-carbon transformation.Universities and scientific research institutions have advanced information and have talent advantages,but due to lack of understanding of the market,they are lacking in the practical application of scientific research results.The industry-university-research collaborative innovation model gives full play to the advantages of the two,promotes the formation of technological achievements from cutting-edge theories and realizes the industrialization of the construction industry,effectively promoting the development of green buildings.While having many advantages,the construction industry industry-university-research collaborative innovation is also facing difficulties such as high pre-negotiation failure rate and frequent opportunistic behaviors in the cooperation phase.In order to study how to effectively solve the above problems and facilitate the collaborative innovation of industry-university-research in the construction industry,This paper takes the construction industry as the main research object,constructs the evolutionary game model of construction enterprises,universities and scientific research institutions and the government in the cooperative negotiation stage and the collaborative innovation stage respectively,and explores the influencing factors and interactive mechanism of behavioral choices among multiple agents.The main research conclusions are as follows:(1)In the construction of the evolutionary game model of construction companies,universities and scientific research institutions and the government in the stage of cooperation negotiations,introduce the government reputation cost,explore and promote the government to actively participate in the guidance,and construction companies and universities and scientific research institutions choose to reach cooperation intentions together.Influencing factors of technological innovation strategy.According to the results of the evolutionary game,it can be seen that the internal factors that affect the alliance’s agreement are the expected additional innovation benefits and the innovation costs that need to be borne by collaborative innovation.For construction companies,it also includes the carbon emission reductions brought about by technological innovation;influence the alliance’s agreement.The external factors are the innovation subsidies provided by the government and preferential carbon emission tax rates.By increasing the benefits of cooperative innovation,controlling innovation costs,setting a reasonable cost-sharing factor,increasing cooperative innovation subsidies,and increasing carbon tax incentives will help the industry-university-research alliance’s cooperation intentions.From the perspective of economic benefits,high innovation subsidies and carbon tax incentives and management costs are not conducive to the government’s participation in the guidance of industry-university-research alliances.However,as a regulatory agency,high reputation loss will form a strong constraint on the government and encourage its government to be active.Participate in the guidance of industry-university-research alliances.(2)In the construction of the evolutionary game model of construction companies,universities and scientific research institutions and the government in the stage of collaborative innovation,considering that knowledge spillovers may bring opportunistic behavior,introduce knowledge spillover benefits and exit penalties,to explore the maintain the influencing factors which promote the government to actively participate in the guidance,and maintain the alliance of the construction companies,universities and scientific research institutions.According to the results of the evolutionary game,it can be seen that the factors affecting the stability of the alliance can be divided into two aspects: on the one hand,the internal factors of the industry-university-research alliance,including the additional benefits obtained by the construction enterprise,universities and scientific research institutions from maintaining collaborative innovation to the end of the cooperation,and internal default of the alliance Fines,and knowledge spillover effects caused by technology diffusion.On the other hand,the relevant factors under the guidance of the government.From the perspective of incentives,they include innovation subsidies and tax incentives;from the perspective of punishment,they impose government fines on participants who take opportunistic behaviors.All in all,by increasing the innovation income of the industry-university-research alliance,increasing internal default fines,increasing cooperative innovation subsidies,controlling knowledge spillovers,increasing carbon tax incentives,and government fines will enhance the stability of the alliance.Based on the above conclusions,build a multi-subject collaborative system for technological innovation of construction enterprises,and by strengthening the government’s guiding role in the construction industry’s industry-university-research collaborative innovation,effectively promote the achievement of cooperation intentions and maintain the stability of the alliance,and continuously promote the low-carbon technological innovation of construction enterprises behavior.