In order to achieve the major national strategic goal of "dual carbon",China has issued a series of policies to vigorously support the development of electric vehicles.As a supporting facility for electric vehicles to provide energy supply,charging piles have attracted widespread attention from the society.With the continuous increase in the number of electric vehicles,the number of charging piles is insufficient,and the problem of insufficient interconnection between charging pile operators has become increasingly prominent.Due to the high cost of construction and operation of charging piles,it is difficult to rely on the construction and operation of charging pile operators alone,which affects the rapid development of electric vehicles.The construction and operation mode of charging piles urgently needs innovation.At present,operators mostly use alliances with their stakeholders to relieve the heavy pressure brought by construction and operation,such as the alliance between charging pile operators and electric vehicle manufacturers,and the alliance between charging pile operators and third-party charging service platforms.This kind of alliance is more common.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the cooperation strategy between the participating subjects under the above two alliance methods.In this paper,the following researches are done to solve the above problems:Firstly,under the government subsidy policy,the optimal decisions and profits of both parties before the alliance of charging pile operators and electric vehicle manufacturers are discussed;then,in the case of the alliance between the two parties,the electric vehicle manufacturers provide the charging pile operators with a revenue sharing contract for cooperation,the optimal revenue sharing contract parameters are obtained by constructing a game model between the two parties.The results show that after electric vehicle manufacturers provide revenue sharing contracts to carry out alliances,they can encourage charging pile operators to increase the number of charging piles,increase the profits of both parties in the alliance,and achieve Pareto improvement.Finally,through numerical analysis,the effectiveness of the revenue sharing cooperation strategy is verified.Secondly,under the alliance model of charging pile operators and third-party charging service platforms,the platform’s pricing cooperation strategy for charging pile operators is discussed,and different pricing cooperation strategies and discrimination conditions for the platform to operators and charging users are obtained.Numerical analysis discusses the impact of intra-group network externalities on alliance cooperation strategies and profits.Research shows that excessive competition among operators will adversely affect charging users,operators,and platforms,but when the two jointly affect platform profits,platform interests will not necessarily be damaged.Finally,the above conclusions are summarized to provide a theoretical basis for the further development of the charging pile industry and the cooperation between the participating entities of the alliance. |