Research On The Four-Party Evolution Game Of Taxi Market Based On Network Reservation

As an important means of transportation in urban travel,traditional taxis have become an indispensable part of urban residents’ transportation due to their convenience and flexibility.With the sharing economy deeply rooted in the hearts of the people,the popularity of online car hailing continues to rise,on the one hand,making it convenient for people to travel and alleviating the pressure of urban public transportation;On the other hand,it has brought great impact to the traditional taxi industry and brought great challenges to the government’s supervision.The Chinese government has always attached great importance to the regulation of the taxi market,and from 2016 to 2022,the Regulations on the Administration of Taxi Business Services and the Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Taxi Business Services have been continuously revised and improved.The revision of the measures put forward guiding opinions on current taxi market supervision,and how to make the management measures play a greater role is a key measure to solve the problem of taxi market supervision.This thesis focuses on the role of the government,passengers,online car hailing and traditional taxis restricting the role of the main body of the game subject to promoting the tax market regulation,and research on how to actively participate in market supervision of passengers,online car hailing and traditional taxis.First of all,analyze the development process of traditional taxis and online car rental,and use Z City as an example to analyze the status and problem-dissection.The theoretical analysis of the taxi market through the theoretical of the stakeholders,including the government,passengers,online car rental and traditional rental car;Secondly,on the premise of clarifying the main body of interests,the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the four-way game subjects is analyzed by the theory of evolution game;then,according to the external and entrusted agent theory,build a mixed strategy game matrix;Finally,by the copy dynamic equation and the elegant comparison matrix,the relationship between the variables that affect the selection of the subject’s strategy is solved.Based on the balancing point analysis of the system in the system,the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy(ESS)is obtained.To clarify the impact of key variables on the balance results,using MATLAB 2018 to simulate the key variables to verify the effectiveness of the evolution game results.Research indicates:(1)Passengers,online ride-hailing and traditional taxis actively participating in supervision are the key to promoting the effective governance of the taxi market.The evolution game results of the main body of the game show that the mutual supervision of online car rental and traditional taxis is formed by the spontaneous competition of interests and does not consume third-party resources.Passengers participating in supervision will play a pivotal role in alleviating the pressure of government supervision.The government should improve the complaint feedback mechanism to motivate passengers to participate in supervision.When the government,passengers,online ride-hailing and traditional taxis are selected(strict supervision,participation in supervision,compliant operation,compliant operation),the evolution game of the subject tends to the optimal solution to encourage passengers to participate in supervision.The monitoring of online ride-hailing and traditional taxis restricts the consensus of the main players to promote the tax market regulation.(2)The ability to withstand the losses of reputation for online ride-hailing and traditional taxis is different.System dynamic simulation results of evolutionary game indicate: When online car rental and traditional taxis monitor the losses of reputation increase from 1 to 25,traditional taxis tend to be faster than online car rental.However,for passengers’ reputation loss from 4 to34,compared with traditional taxis,the ride-hailing has tended to be faster in compliance.Therefore,the supervision of the taxi market is inseparable from the government’s overall decision-making,passengers’ supervision,online ride-hailing and traditional taxis restricting each other’s supervision.The quadrilateral subjects are complementary to each other,so as to build a stable taxi market environment.(3)The case of Chongqing has verified the effectiveness of the evolutionary game and simulation analysis.Examples show that from 2016-2019,the number of passengers in Chongqing fell from 115,313 to 36,249.The number of traditional taxis and online taxis has continued to increase,restricting each other’s supervision,forcing the government to strictly supervise,and improving the feedback mechanism of passenger complaints.The violation rate of online car rental drops from 63.7%to 26.23%.Therefore,improving the feedback mechanism of passenger complaints is an important measure to achieve effective management of the taxi market.At the same time,reputation value is also a key variable for active compliance operations for online car hailing and traditional taxis.