Research On Emergency Material Reserve And Pricing Decision Considering Social Donation

At present,global emergencies occur frequently,and the emergency management to deal with emergencies is becoming more and more important.At the same time,these emergencies also put forward higher and higher requirements for the rapid response of emergency materials.Due to the uncertainty of emergencies and the time limit of many emergency supplies,the Joint Reserve of the government and the supplier has more advantages than the government’s single source emergency supplies reserve.At the same time,with the development of social economy and the continuous improvement of the sense of social responsibility of enterprises and individuals,social donations have gradually occupied an important place in the source of emergency materials.Therefore,by considering social donation,this paper constructs the joint reserve model of local government and supplier in response to regional general scale natural disasters,and the joint reserve model of central government and supplier in response to diffuse public health emergencies.That is,aiming at the minimum expected cost of the government and the maximum expected profit of the supplier,the optimal pricing of the government and the optimal reserve equilibrium decision of the supplier are obtained through sequential game.Further,through numerical examples,this paper discusses and analyzes the impact of disaster occurrence probability,the government’s own reserve and the level of social donation on the joint reserve.It is found that the improvement of disaster occurrence probability has a positive effect on the cooperation between government and enterprises,but the high level of donation will inhibit the supplier’s enthusiasm to participate in the cooperation.The impact of the government’s own reserves on joint reserves is more complex.In the regional natural disaster model,the increase of its own reserves will promote the cooperation of suppliers at the beginning,but when its own reserves reach a certain value,it will weaken the cooperation enthusiasm of suppliers.In the public health emergency model,with the increase of its own reserves,the cost of the government and the profit of the supplier will increase,but the reserve of the supplier will gradually decrease.When the government’s own reserves are high enough,cooperation will not be reached.At the same time,through the comparative analysis of the two models,it is found that there are great differences in the sensitivity analysis results of variables in different situations,which shows that different disaster types and the accuracy of government demand prediction will have different effects on the cooperation between government and enterprises.Finally,this paper further analyzes the mode of government independent reserve of emergency materials considering the impact of social donation.By calculating the expected cost function of the government and the expected profit function of the supplier,it is found that under the two disaster backgrounds,the mode of Joint Reserve of emergency materials between the government and the supplier has more advantages,which not only reduces the cost of the government,but also improves the profit of the supplier.This paper further optimizes and improves the mode and strategy of Joint Reserve of emergency materials,which has important management enlightenment for both government and enterprise cooperation.