Research On The Mode Of Rural Land Trusteeship Based On The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game Theory

Farmland trust provides a feasible path for the effective connection of small farmers with modern agriculture and the promotion of rural development.In 2020,the No.1 Central Document continued to put emphasis on cultivating new agricultural business entities such as family farms and farmers’ cooperatives,and integrating small farmers into the agricultural industry chain through order-based agriculture,stock dividends,and trusteeship services.As a new agricultural management model,farmland trust has become an important research content of China’s agricultural policy.It has received widespread attention from local governments and the media,and has achieved significant results in current rural practices.No matter it is a “full-support” model or a“semi-support” model,the trusteeship organization comprehensively utilizes its own resource endowments and external advantages to optimize the allocation of farmland,capital,technology,services,and informal institutions,which can realize a win-win situation of farmers,trusteeship organizations,the local government and other multi-party entities.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory,this paper uses the literature combing analysis method,typical case analysis method,comparative analysis method,on-the-field interview method,and game model analysis method to conduct in-depth research on the current rural land trusteeship management model.First of all,the concepts of farmland trust and related theories are defined through literature review.Secondly,based on the evolutionary game theory,the three parties including the local government,trusteeship organization,and farmer are simultaneously considered as the main interest individual of the game,and a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the behavioral motivation and strategy choices of each individual,and discuss the evolutionary stability strategy of each individual under the interaction.Thirdly,based on typical cases and on-the-field interviews,the "full support" and "semi-support" models carried out by rural professional cooperatives are sorted out and summarized.By analyzing the relationships and behavioral motivations among various stakeholders such as local government,cooperatives,and farmers,the theoretical conclusion of the evolutionary game model is supported.Finally,according to the results of game equilibrium and case analysis,and combined with China’s land trusteeship practice,this paper puts forward countermeasures and suggestions for the local government,cooperatives,farmers and other subjects to promote a stable and long-term development of rural land trusteeship cooperatively.Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory and taking land trusteeship management modes of Jian’ou city as an example,this paper analyzes each individuals’ interest demand under the land trusteeship management mode,and obtains the optimal solution for the interests of all parties,in order to promote the stable and long-term development of the land trusteeship management mode and the long-term rural development.