Research On The Co-Opetition Between Banks And Industrial Finance In The Supply Chain Finance Platform

Compared with traditional supply chain finance,supply chain financial platform business integrates "ABCDI five major financial technologies"((ie:artificial intelligence,block chain,cloud computing,big data,Internet of Things),links capital and assets,integrates transaction financing data,and opens up a new path for financing of small and medium-sized enterprises lacking qualifications through credit empowerment of core enterprises.With the vigorous support of the national policies,it is gradually becoming an industry trend.As an important part of the supply chain financial platform business,the main body of the capital has a significant impact on the operating performance of the entire platform business.Banks and industrial finance are the main participants on the capital side,and their co-opetition determines the smoothness and operational efficiency of platform funds.Therefore,this paper hopes to summarize experience,explore rules,and provide suggestions by discussing the co-opetition between banks and industrial finance in the platform business model.On the basis of reviewing relevant literature,this research analyzes the market competition pattern of supply chain financial platform business in China,the basic forms of co-opetition between banks and industrial finance in supply chain financial platform business,and uses the "Cournot Model" to discuss the static co-opetition and the "Game Model" to discuss the dynamic co-opetition respectively.Furthermore,this research adopts the grounded research method to analyze the "pushing force","pulling force" and "resistance force" that affect the co-opetition relationship.The study found that:1.At present,the supply chain financial platform industry is in the stage of "monopolistic competition",and there may be three relationships between banks and industrial finance in carrying out supply chain financial platform business:competition without cooperation,both competition and cooperation,and cooperation without competition.2.Static game analysis shows that cooperation is the best choice for banks and industrial finance in the platform business;3.Dynamic game analysis shows that:The game relationship may have various forms of"competition-cooperation",and the game between industrial finance and banks is a continuous cycle process,which is affected by key variables such as the revenue,cost and distribution ratio of the co-opetition.4.Through the empirical analysis of grounded theory,this paper discusses the deeper reasons that affect co-opetition from different internal and external aspects.Based on these conclusions,the study suggests that banks,industrial finance,and regulatory agencies should:1.Attaching importance to their own resource endowments and adopting differentiated competition strategies;2.Strengthen exchanges and cooperation to achieve multi-party integration and win-win;3.Attaching importance to the application of emerging technologies and injecting new kinetic energy into product innovation;4.Industry supervision rules need to be further clarified;5.The construction of industry standards needs to be strengthened;6.Government funds and institutional support should be increased.